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ABSTRACT 
Temporal Discounting of Losses 
David J. Hardisty 
This dissertation presents a series of five papers to better understand how to measure 
discounting, how and why discounting of losses differs from discounting of gains, and how to 
apply research on discounting to public policy. Paper 1 compares two common methods of 
measuring discounting – titration and matching – with a dynamic "multiple staircase" method 
adapted from psychophysics. Paper 2 examines the robustness of the sign effect across financial, 
environmental, and health domains. Paper 3 explores the interaction of sign and magnitude, and 
offers an explanation for why losses reverse or eliminate the magnitude effect. Paper 4 
investigates an explanation for the sign effect: that dread looms larger than pleasurable 
anticipation, and Paper 5 offers an integrative approach to intertemporal choice, with 
recommendations for environmental policy. Taken together, these investigations suggest that 
discounting of losses is both quantitatively and qualitatively different from discounting of gains. 
Across domains and methods losses are discounted much less than gains and losses eliminate (or 
reverse) the magnitude effect. These behavioral differences occur because "dread" of losses is 
more pronounced than pleasurable anticipation of gains. In other words, people dislike having 
losses hanging over their heads more than they enjoy looking forward to positive events. For this 
reason, while people almost universally want to have gains immediately (due to impatience and 
other reasons), people are divided about losses – sometimes preferring to realize them 
immediately, and sometimes preferring to postpone them. Theories and policies involving 
intertemporal choice must distinguish between losses and gains if they hope to accurately 
describe and predict people's choices.  
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Throughout life, we are constantly making decisions about what to experience now, and 
what to put off until later. For example, when we buy something, should we pay right away with 
cash or a debit card, or do we put it on a credit card and postpone payment until the future? 
When deciding what to have for dinner, do we choose something that is delicious (but 
unhealthy), or something that will bring us future health benefits? When facing such choices, 
people generally discount future outcomes, and there are several reasons for doing so: the future 
is uncertain, we expect to have more free time and money in the future, and we are often simply 
impatient.  
 Several models have been developed to describe the way that people should make or do 
make intertemporal tradeoffs. Currently, the exponential, hyperbolic, quasi-hyperbolic, and area-
under-the-curve models are the most popular. The exponential equation is V=Ae
-kD
, where V is 
subjective value, A is the future amount, e = 2.718..., k is the discount rate, and D is the delay in 
years. For example, with a 10% discount rate, the promise of getting $50 in two years is 
subjectively worth only $40.94 today (the equation with numbers plugged in is 40.94 = 
50*2.718
-.1*2
). This continuously compounded exponential model is the rational standard for 
discounting. However, a growing literature has documented that people's actual choices are 
typically fit better by a hyperbolic model, V=A/(1+kD), where V is subjective value, A is the 
future amount, k is the discount rate, and D is the delay (which can be in any units). In this 
model, value drops off sharply, but then plateaus as delay increases. More recently, a hybrid, 
quasi-hyperbolic (or "beta-delta") model has been proposed, V = A{1,ßδD}, where V is the 
subjective value, A is the future amount, ß and δ are discount parameters. The model has a 





immediately available are worth their full value (i.e., "1"), whereas delayed outcomes are 
discounted by a fixed amount (i.e., "ß<1") as well as an amount that scales with delay (i.e., "δ"). 
The "delta" (i.e., δ) component of the model represents a rational, exponential discounting 
process, while the beta (i.e., "ß") component represents irrational impatience to have things 
immediately. While intuitively compelling, this model has not received as much empirical 
support as the (more parsimonious) hyperbolic model, and it carries no normative weight. See 
Figure 1, below, for a comparison of these three models.  
Figure 1 






More recently, a supposedly theory-free way of describing intertemporal preference has been 
proposed: the area-under-the-curve (or AUC). Using this method, intertemporal indifference 
points are elicited experimentally and then connected with straight lines, and the area under these 
lines is summed and expressed as a fraction of 1, where an AUC of 1 means that time has no 
impact on value, while an AUC near zero would indicate extreme impatience.  
 Many contextual factors affect people's discount rates, including the sign effect, 
magnitude effect, direction effect, preference for improving sequences, and preference for 
spread. The sign effect (Thaler, 1981) describes the fact that gains are discounted more than 
losses. For example, when faced with a choice between getting $5 today or $5 in a year, almost 
everyone would choose the immediate $5, whereas when choosing between losing $5 today or in 
a year, so people prefer the immediate loss and some prefer the future loss. The direction effect 
(Loewenstein, 1988; Weber et al, 2007) is the fact that people are biased in favor of the default 
time of payment or receipt. So, for example, if offered the choice between getting $10 today or 
$11 in a year, and the default is to get the immediate $10 (with the possibility of delaying 
consumption), most people will choose that option, whereas if the default is the future $11 (with 
the possibility of accelerating consumption), most people will choose that option.  The 
magnitude effect describes the fact that discount rates are generally lower for larger amounts 
(Thaler, 1981). For example, when choosing between getting $10 today or $12 in a year, most 
people will prefer the $10 today, but when choosing between $10,000 today or $12,000 in a year, 
more people will prefer the future $12,000. When faced with sequences of outcomes, such as an 
income profile or health profile, most people prefer an improving sequence (given that the 
overall average is the same) (Chapman, 1996). This runs contrary the traditional discounting 





is the preference for spread: when asked to schedule positive events, such as dinners out a nice 
restaurants, people often prefer to space them out over time, rather than having all the good 
things as soon as possible (Frederick, 2008).  
 While all these discounting "anomalies" have been thoroughly documented, process data 
to understand why these happen are few and far between. This has been especially lacking for 
the sign effect, because not only are losses discounted less than gains, but losses also reverse or 
eliminate the typical magnitude and direction effects. No mainstream models of discounting 
currently explain or predict this pattern of preferences. Furthermore, methods for measuring 
discount rates are not standardized within the field, and little is known about how different 
measurement methods influence discounting, and which methods are to be preferred.  
 With this in mind, this dissertation presents a series of five papers to better understand 
how to measure discounting, how and why discounting of losses differs from discounting of 
gains, and how to apply research on discounting to public policy. Paper 1 compares two common 
methods of measuring discounting – titration and matching – with a dynamic "multiple staircase" 
method adapted from psychophysics. Paper 2 examines the robustness of the sign effect across 
financial, environmental, and health domains. Paper 3 explores the interaction of sign and 
magnitude, and offers an explanation for why losses reverse or eliminate the magnitude effect. 
Paper 4 investigates an explanation for the sign effect: that dread looms larger than pleasurable 
anticipation, and Paper 5 offers an integrative approach to intertemporal choice, with 
recommendations for environmental policy.  
 Taken together, these investigations suggest that discounting of losses is both 





losses are discounted much less than gains and losses eliminate (or reverse) the magnitude effect. 
These behavioral differences occur because "dread" of losses is more pronounced than 
pleasurable anticipation of gains. In other words, people dislike having losses hanging over their 
heads more than they enjoy looking forward to positive events. For this reason, while people 
almost universally want to have gains immediately (due to impatience and other reasons), people 
are divided about losses – sometimes preferring to realize them immediately, and sometimes 
preferring to postpone them. Theories and policies involving intertemporal choice must 











Paper 1: How to measure discount rates? An experimental comparison of three methods. 
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Time preferences for financial and air quality gains and losses at delays of 
up to 50 years were elicited using three different methods: matching, 
fixed-sequence choice titration, and a dynamic "multiple staircase" choice 
method. Results indicate that the choice-based methods are prone to 
influencing participants' discount rates through the magnitude and order of 
options presented to participants. However, choice-based methods are 
easier for participants to understand and are better at predicting 
consequential intertemporal choices such as smoking. No consistent 
advantages were found for the multiple staircase over simple titration. 






How to measure discount rates? An experimental comparison of three methods. 
 Throughout life, people are constantly making choices about what to do or have 
immediately, and what to put off until later. Whenever someone chooses an immediate benefit at 
the expense of a larger delayed benefit, that person is said to exhibit temporal discounting 
(Samuelson, 1937). Similarly, if someone chooses to avoid an immediate loss in favor of a 
larger, later loss (for example, postponing a credit-card payment), this represents discounting as 
well. Laboratory measures of discounting can predict many important real-world behaviors, 
including credit card debt, smoking, exercise, body-mass index, and infidelity (Chabris, Laibson, 
Morris, Schuldt, & Taubinsky, 2008; Meier & Sprenger, 2010; Reimers, Maylor, Stewart, & 
Chater, 2009).  
 Despite the growing popularity of research on temporal discounting, there is relatively 
little consensus or empirical research on measurement techniques and best practices. a 
comprehensive review paper on discounting (Frederick, Loewenstein, & O'Donoghue, 2002) 
noted a huge heterogeneity in discount rates between studies, and hypothesized that variability in 
measurement methods might have been a major cause. 52% of studies used choice-based 
measures, 31% used matching, and 17% used another method. 
Measuring discount rates: Choice vs matching 
 Choice-based methods generally present participants with a series of binary comparisons 
and use these to infer an indifference point which is then converted into a discount rate. For 
example, suppose a participant is presented with a choice between receiving $10 immediately or 
$11 in one year, and he chooses the immediate option, and that subsequently the participant must 





implies that the participant would be roughly indifferent between $10 today and $11.50 in one 
year. This indifference point can then be converted into a discount rate using a number of 
different models (discussed below). For example, using the normative, continuously-
compounded exponential model, this would yield a discount rate of 14%. The matching method, 
in contrast, asks for the indifference point directly. For example, it might ask the participant what 
amount "X" would make him indifferent between $10 immediately and $X in one year. 
  How do results from these two methods compare?  Ahlbrecht & Weber (1997) and Read 
& Roelofsma (2003) tested both methods in within-subjects designs and found that matching 
yielded lower discount rates than choice. Why does this happen? One hypothesis is that in choice 
people are motivated to take the earlier amount, and pay relatively more attention to the delay, 
while for matching they are more likely focus on the amounts and attempt to balance the two 
attributes (Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic, 1988). However, neither of the previously mentioned 
studies manipulated order, so it is difficult to know whether experience with the matching task 
influenced participants' answers on the choice task. Frederick (2003) compared seven different 
elicitation methods for current vs future lives, in a mixed design. He also found that matching 
produced lower discount rates than choice, but again, order effects were not explored. He 
speculated that the choice task creates demand characteristics: offering the choice between 
different amounts of immediate and future lives implies that one ought to discount them to some 
extent -- "otherwise, why would the experimenter be asking the question." In contrast, the 
matching method makes no suggestions as to what amounts are appropriate.   
 Further evidence that choice options can bias discount rates comes from a pair of studies 
comparing two different variations on a choice-based measure. One version presented choices 





order affected discount rates, such that participants were more patient when answer the questions 
in descending order (Robles & Vargas, 2008; Robles, Vargas, & Bejarano, 2009). 
 While these studies describe some interesting differences between the methods, they offer 
little guidance regarding which technique researchers ought to use. One perspective would argue 
that because preferences are constructed, the results from different measures are equally valid 
expressions of people's preferences, and it is impossible to choose a best measure. However, if 
researchers are interested in predicting and explaining real-world behaviors in other contexts, 
this provides an objective metric by which to make a judgment. While several studies have 
shown this link for choice-based techniques, we are not aware of any studies examining how 
well matching predicts consequential decisions.  
 Another question concerns how these different elicitation techniques perform with non-
traditional delays and outcomes. Most studies have focused on financial delays in the range of 6 
months to a few years, but many consequential real-world intertemporal choices, such as 
retirement savings, smoking, or environmental decisions, involve much longer delays and 
diverse consequences.  
The Current Research 
 We compared matching with choice-based methods of eliciting discount rates, in a mixed 
design. Half the participants completed matching, then choice, while the other half did the 
opposite order. This allowed us to analyze the data as both within and between subjects. Within 
each measurement technique, delays varied from one year to fifty years. Also, all participants 





scenario. Outcome sign was manipulated between subjects, such that half the participants 
considered current vs future gains, while the other half considered current vs future losses.  
 Within the choice-based condition, we compared two different techniques: fixed-
sequence titration and a dynamic multiple staircase method. While the titration method 
presented participants with a pre-set list of choices, the multiple staircase method (described in 
detail in Appendix C) dynamically selected choice options based on participants' previous 
answers, to funnel in on participants' indifference points more efficiently. Within the titration 
condition, we manipulated presentation order to be from low-to-high or high-to-low.  
At the end of the survey, we presented participants with a consequential choice between 
$100 today or $200 next year, and randomly paid out two participants for real money. We also 
asked participants whether they smoked or not, to get a consequential life choice.  
We compared the measurement methods in four different categories: ability to detect 
inattentive participants, differences in central tendency and variability, ease of use for 
participants, and ability to predict consequential intertemporal choices. We predicted that the 
multiple staircase method would be best at detecting inattentive participants, because we 
designed it partly with this purpose in mind. We predicted that the choice based methods would 
show higher discount rates than the matching method, based on the results from previous 
research discussed above. We predicted that the choice based methods would be easier for 
participants to understand and use, based on anecdotal evidence from our own previous research 
indicating that participants often have a hard time with the concept of indifference, and have a 
hard time picking a number "out of the air" without any reference. Finally, we predicted that the 





natural congruence in using choice to predict choice, and because previous studies have 
established the efficacy of choice-based methods but none have been published in support of 
matching.  
Methods 
516 participants (68% female, mean age=38, SD=13) were recruited online for a study on 
decision making and randomly assigned to an experimental condition. Participants in the gain 
condition read the following hypothetical scenario:  
Imagine the city you live in has a budget surplus that it is planning to pay 
out as rebates of $300 for each citizen. The city is also considering 
investing the surplus in endowment funds that will mature at different 
possible times in the future. The funds would allow the city to offer 
rebates of a different amount, to be paid at different possible times in the 
future. For the purposes of answering these questions, please assume that 
you will not move away from your current city, even if that is unlikely to 
be true in reality.    
The full text all the scenarios can be found in Appendix A. After reading the scenario, 
participants then indicated their intertemporal preferences in one of three different ways. In the 
matching condition, participants filled in a blank with an amount that would make them 
indifferent between $300 immediately and another amount in the future (see Appendix B for 
examples of the questions using each measurement method). Participants answered questions 
about three different delays: 1 year, 10 years, or 50 years. Although many participants might 
expect to be dead in 50 years, the scenario described future gains that would benefit everyone in 
their city, so it was hoped that those future gains would still have meaning to participants. In the 
titration condition, participants made a series of choices between immediate and future amounts, 
at each delay. Because the same set of choices were presented for each delay (see Appendix B 





at long delays. The order of the future amounts was balanced between participants, such that half 
answered lists with amounts going from low to high (as in Appendix B), and others were 
presented with amounts going from high to low. In the multiple staircase, participants also made 
a series of choices between immediate and future amounts. Unlike the simple titration method, 
these amounts were selected dynamically, funneling in on the participants indifference points. 
Choices were presented one at a time (unlike titration, which presented all choices on one page). 
Also unlike titration, the questions from the three delays were interleaved in a random fashion. 
The complete multiple staircase method is described in detail in Appendix C.  
 In all conditions progress in the intertemporal choice task was indicated with a progress 
bar. Also in all conditions, participants could refer back to the scenario as they were answering 
the questions. After completing the intertemporal choice task, participants were asked "What 
things did you think about as you answered the previous questions? Please give a brief summary 
of your thoughts:" This was done to get some qualitative measure of the process participants 
went through while responding to the questions.  
 Next, participants answered the same intertemporal choice scenario using a different 
measurement method. Those who initially were given a choice-based measure (titration or 
multiple staircase) subsequently completed a matching measure, while those who began with 
matching then completed a choice-based measure. In other words, all participants completed a 
matching measure, either before or after completing a choice-based measure. This design was 
chosen because the matching measure is relatively quick for participants to complete, so it was 





 Subsequently, participants were given an attention check, very similar to the Instructional 
Manipulation Check (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009), which ascertained whether or 
not participants were reading instructions.   
 After that, participants read an environmental discounting scenario, the full text of which 
can be found in Appendix A. This asked them to choose between an immediate amount of 
money, and a change in air quality that would happen at different times. In other words, 
participants were asked how much the change in air quality was worth, depending on the delay. 
There were four different delays in the air quality scenario: immediate, 1 year, 10 years, and 50 
years. Again, it was hoped that the 50-year delayed change in air quality would still be 
meaningful to participants because it would affect the residents of the city they lived in.  
 Next, participants completed demographics, including a question about whether they 
were a smoker or not. Finally, participants completed a consequential measure of intertemporal 
choice, in which they chose between receiving $100 immediately or $200 in one year (note that 
participants in the loss condition still chose between two gains in this case, due to the fact that it 
would be difficult to execute losses for real money). Participants were informed that two people 
would be randomly selected and have their choices paid out for real money, and this indeed 
happened.  
Results and Discussion 
 Detecting inattentive participants 
 In most psychology research, and especially in online research, there are often 
participants that do not pay much attention and/or do not respond carefully. It is helpful, 





had two built in check questions (described above) to detect such participants. The titration 
method can also detect inattention, by looking for instances of switching back and forth, or 
switching perversely. For example, if a participant preferred $475 in one year over $300 today, 
but preferred $300 today over $900 in one year, this would be a sign of inattention. It is nearly 
impossible for a single matching measure to detect inattention, but with multiple measure at 
different time points, matching may identify those participants who show a non-monotonic effect 
of time. For example, if the one year indifference point (with respect to $300 immediately) is 
$5000, the ten year indifference point is $600, and the fifty year indifference point is $500000, 
this would be evidence of inattention.  
 As described above, each participant also completed another attention check, which was 
very similar to the Instructional Manipulation Check (Oppenheimer, et al., 2009). As this 
measure has been empirically shown to be effective for detecting inattentive participants, we 
compared the ability of each measurement method to predict IMC status.  
  Correlations between the IMC test and of attention each measure's test of attention 
revealed that while neither matching, r=.07, p>.1, nor titration, r=.06, p>.1 were able to detect 
inattentive participants, the multiple staircase method had modest success, r=.19, p<.05. Overall, 
then, most methods were poor at detecting inattentive participants, but the multiple staircase 
method was superior to the others.  
 For all of the following analyses, we only wanted to compare those participants who were 
paying attention and reading instructions. Therefore, we excluded those participants who failed 
the IMC, leaving 316 participants for further analysis.  





Indifference points were computed for each participant and time delay as follows: in 
matching, the number given by participants was used directly. In titration, the average of the 
values around the switch point was used. For example, if a participant preferred $300 
immediately over $475 in ten years, but preferred $900 in ten years over $300 immediately, the 
participant was judged to be indifferent between $300 immediately and $687.50 in ten years. In 
multiple staircase, the average of the established upper bound and lower bound was used, in a 
similar manner to titration. These indifference points were then converted to discount rates, using 
three different popular equations: exponential, hyperbolic, and area under the curve. The 
continuously compounded exponential discount rate (Samuelson, 1937) is V=Ae
-kD
, where  V is 
the present value, A is the future amount, e is the constant (2.718...), D is the delay in years, and 
k is the discount rate. This is the normative model of discounting. The hyperbolic model (Mazur, 
1987) is V=A / (1+kD), where V is the present value, A is the future amount, D is the delay 
(often in years), and k is the discount rate. This hyperbolic model has been found to descriptively 
model discounting data better than the exponential model. The third discounting equation we 
used was the area under the curve (AUC) metric, which sets the present value equal to one and 
the longest delay equal to one and computes the fraction that future amounts are worth by 
computing the area under the curve of the indifference points (Myerson, Green, & 
Warusawitharana, 2001), by summing (x2-x1)*[(y2+y1)/2] for each indifference point, where x1 is 
the sooner time point, x2 is the later time point, y1 is the sooner amount, and y2 is the later 
amount. This generally yields a fraction between 1 and 0 where lower numbers mean more 
discounting. The AUC is supposedly a theory-free measure of discounting behavior. It is 
important to note that in addition to the differences in theory and explanatory power, these three 





minimizes extreme discounting, it magnifies extreme negative discounting. For example, if 
someone reports that they would pay $5 for an increase in air quality starting today, but $15 for 
an increase in air quality starting in one year, this would yield an AUC of 10, which is quite 
extreme given that the scale normally yields values between 1 and 0.  
Because order effects were observed (which we describe below), the majority of the 
analyses to follow will focus on the first measurement method that participants completed. This 
leaves 154 in the matching condition, 82 in the titration condition, and 80 in the multiple 
staircase condition. Discount rates from each condition are summarized in Table 1. Because 
skew and outliers were sometimes pronounced, this table lists median and interquartile range in 
addition to mean and standard deviation.  
  As is clear from Table 1, many different stories can be told from the data depending on 
the measurement method and discounting model used. For example, when using the exponential 
formula, the titration method shows the largest standard deviation for financial gains, whereas 
when using the AUC formula, the matching method shows the largest standard deviation. Yet, 
there are some consistencies across measurements methods and equations. In all cases, whether 
using matching, titration or multiple staircase; exponential discounting, hyperbolic discounting 
or AUC; means or medians; financial gains were always discounted more than financial losses 
(when looking at Table 1, recall that AUC is reverse scored relative to the other measures).   
Table 1 
Means, standard deviations, medians, and interquartile ranges (IQRs) for three methods of 
measuring discount rates (matching, multiple staircase, and titration) for financial gains and 





compounded exponential model, the hyperbolic model, and the area under the curve (AUC). 
Note that for the first two models, higher numbers mean more discounting, while with the AUC 
lower numbers mean more discounting.  
Financial 
Outcome  
Exponential Discount Rate Hyperbolic Discount Rate Area Under the Curve 
Mean SD Median IQR Mean SD Median IQR Mean SD Median IQR 
matching, gain .24 .21 .23 .23 2.47 8.53 .74 1.11 .43 1.38 .17 .20 
m-stairs, gain .46 .38 .34 .37 6.03 16.01 2.55 2.14 .13 .08 .11 .12 
titration, gain .41 .52 .18 .30 10.27 34.43 1.59 3.07 .16 .10 .15 .15 
matching, loss .08 .33 .08 .21 .53 1.47 .15 .41 4.93 32.77 .44 .36 
m-stairs, loss .22 .26 .12 .23 1.29 2.92 .29 .53 .35 .27 .25 .32 
titration, loss .27 .51 .10 .24 3.69 14.29 .14 .58 .60 .65 .40 .61 
 
 Because most psychological studies of discounting employ the hyperbolic model, our 
further analyses will focus on this model. As this model is subject to skew and outliers, we will 
primarily use non-parametric statistics. Also, we feel that this approach (median hyperbolic 
discount rates) best represents the overall pattern of data.  
As seen in Figure 1, discount rates measured with the choice based methods (titration and 
multiple staircase) were generally higher than discount rates measured with matching, and this 
was particularly true for gains. A Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric ANOVA run on the gain data 
confirmed significant effect of measurement method on discount rates, p<.001, and another 







Median hyperbolic discount rates for financial gains and losses as measured with matching, 
multiple staircase, or titration.  
 
We hypothesized that these difference in discount rates were partly a function of 
anchoring or demand characteristics. In other words, the extreme options sometimes presented to 
participants (such as a choice between $300 today and $85,000 in one year) may have suggested 
that these were reasonable choices, and so encouraged higher discount rates. For comparison, an 
earlier study from our same lab (Hardisty & Weber, 2009, Study 1) with the same participant 
pool using titration for financial outcomes presented participants with a much smaller range of 
options ($250 today vs $230 to $410 in one year) and yielded much lower discount rates: .28 for 















seems, then, the range of options presented to participants affected their discount rates by 
suggesting reasonable options as well as by restricting what participants could or could not 
actually express. We also tested for the influence of the options presented to participants by 
comparing the two orderings, high-to-low and low-to-high. As summarized in Figure 2, this 
ordering manipulation did indeed affect responses. In particular, participants tended to 
perseverate on the side they started out on. So, for example, a participant who began with a 
choice between receiving $300 immediately or $250 in the future would begin by choosing the 
immediately amount, and stay with it for a little while, thus exhibiting a high discount rate (ie, 
greater impatience). In contrast, a participant who was first presented with receiving $300 
immediately vs $85,000 in the future would begin by selecting the future option, and continue to 
choose more future options, thus showing a low discount rate. Losses showed the same effect, 
which translates into discount rates in the opposite manner. For example, a participant who 
begins with a choice between paying $300 now or $250 in the future will likely choose the future 
amount, and continue choosing to pay in the future, which ultimately leads to a higher discount 
rate.   
Figure 2 
Median hyperbolic discount rates for financial gains and losses as measured with titration, 






A Mann-Whitney U test comparing the high-to-low and low-to-high orderings for gains was 
significant, p<.01. A similar test comparing the two orderings for losses was not significant, 
p>.1, but was in the predicted direction.  
 While discount rates were generally much higher when using the choice based methods, 
we feel that this was due to the large range of options that we presented to participants, and it 
would be possible to obtain the opposite pattern of results if only small amounts were used. 
Further evidence for this comes from a within-subjects analysis comparing the different methods: 
although all participants completed a matching measure, some did it before a choice method, and 
some did it after a choice method. Comparing these participants reveals a significant effect of 

















Median hyperbolic discount rates for financial gains and losses as measured with matching, 
broken down by whether participants did the matching task before or after one of the choice 
based measurement methods.  
 
A Kruskal-Wallis test confirmed that participants who answered the choice-based measures first 
gave higher discount rates than those who did matching first, both for gains, p<.001, and for 
losses, p=.05.  
 Just as the mean and median discount rates yielded from the choice-based methods were 
higher than those yielded from the matching method, so too was the spread of the distributions 
from the choice-based methods larger. For example, the interquartile range (IQR) from the 
matching method for gains was 1.1, compared with 2.1 from multiple staircase and 3.1 from 






















staircase and .58 from titration. It is likely that the same factors which led to the higher medians 
in the choice-based methods also produced the greater IQR.  
 Discount rates for the air quality outcomes where computed by comparing how much 
participants valued the immediate change in air quality vs the future change in air quality. For 
example, if someone would pay $100 to avoid an immediate deterioration in air quality, but only 
pay $90 to avoid a deterioration starting in one year, then the hyperbolic discount rate for that 
participant would be (100-90)/(90*1), or .11. Perhaps as a result of the immediate amount being 
variable in addition to the future amounts, this made the variances in discount rates quite large 
for the air quality outcomes, as seen in Table 2. Also, some participants were confused, 
particularly in the matching condition (discussed below), so the discount rates in Table 2 
probably do not represent participants' true preferences. Therefore, we will not analyze them 
very closely, except to note that the same general trends are seen here as well as for the financial 
outcomes: choice-based methods generally produced higher discount rates than matching, and 




                                                          
1
 The astute reader may notice that overall, discount rates for the air quality outcomes are lower than those for 
the financial outcomes. This may seem to contradict Hardisty & Weber (2009), who found little difference in 
discount rates between financial and environmental outcomes. We believe this is due to the fact the 2009 paper 
used within-domain measures of discounting (air quality now vs a different amount of air quality in the future), 
while the present study uses a between domain measure of discounting (how many dollars is air quality worth now 
vs later). An unpublished study by our lab showed that this is indeed the case. We speculate that many participants 
hold a moral conviction that environmental things ought to be worth the same amount no matter when they 
happen, and so many participants show zero discount rates when using this procedure. In contrast, the 2009 paper 
showed that the vast majority of participants prefer a smaller improvement in air quality now over a larger one in 





Table 2  
Means, standard deviations, medians, and interquartile ranges (IQRs) for three methods of 
measuring discount rates (matching, multiple staircase, and titration) for air quality gains and 
losses. Discount rates are summarized for three popular discounting equations: the continuously 
compounded exponential model, the hyperbolic model, and the area under the curve (AUC). 
Note that for the first two models, higher numbers mean more discounting, while with the AUC 




Exponential Discount Rate Hyperbolic Discount Rate Area Under the Curve 
Mean SD Median IQR Mean SD Median IQR Mean SD Median IQR 
matching, gain -.13 .40 .00 .33 .05 .36 .00 .29 17.24 47.30 1.00 8.53 
m-stairs, gain .35 .50 .21 .49 68.53 319.7 1.16 15.63 .30 .34 .14 .38 
titration, gain .18 .27 .05 .35 1.35 3.62 .31 .69 .51 .36 .41 .39 
matching, loss -.02 .25 .00 .20 .08 .30 .00 .21 8.56 50.35 1.00 1.87 
m-stairs, loss .11 .29 .02 .08 3.53 15.22 .03 .19 .73 .56 .72 .67 
titration, loss .04 .22 .00 .05 9.12 58.53 .00 .15 1.51 3.18 1.00 .53 
 
 Overall, then, we have evidence that the options presented to participants in the choice-
based methods affected the discount rates that they expressed. While matching has the advantage 
of not providing any anchors or suggestions to participants, it is nonetheless still quite 
susceptible to influence from other sources. This is not a particularly novel finding, as theories 
and findings of constructed preference (Johnson, Haubl, & Keinan, 2007; Weber et al., 2007) 
and coherent arbitrariness (Ariely, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2003) are plentiful. However, it has 





studies may be explained by differences in the amount and order of options that experimenters 
presented to participants.  
 Ease of use for participants 
 Another factor in determining which method to use is how easy it is for participants to 
complete. Qualitative evidence from piloting and from participants' comments indicated that 
participants often had a hard time understanding and answering the matching questions. They 
had a hard time picking a number "out of the air", and also had a hard time understanding the 
concept of indifference points. While the titration method was relatively easy for participants to 
answer, they found the multiple staircase method quite onerous. Even though the number of 
questions was smaller than for titration, participants perceived it to be longer. It was difficult for 
participants to switch back and forth between different timescales, and participants had trouble 
answering the later questions, which were often quite near their indifference points and so were 
difficult to decide on.  
 Quantitative evidence to support these observations came from participants' responses to 
the environmental scenario. The rational response was to value future improvements or 
deterioration in air quality less than immediate improvements or deterioration in air quality. For 
example, if someone is willing to pay $200 for an immediate improvement in air quality, then 
they should not be willing to pay as much for an improvement that would begin in fifty years. 
We calculated the proportion of participants that valued the fifty year change more than the 
immediate change, and found that it happened 38% of the time with matching, 11% of the time 
with multiple staircase, and 7% of the time with titration. Pairwise proportion tests indicated that 
both of the choice-based methods showed less confused responses than the matching method, 





mistakes when responding to the environmental scenario, rather than expressing their true 
preferences. For example, one typical participant wrote "This was confusing to me. I would 
pretty much always take better air quality over a financial incentive. I wasn't clear whether this 
would mean putting a high value on the rebate option now or in the future." Our interpretation is 
that it is difficult for participants to pull dollar values out of the air, and while this is somewhat 
manageable when participants only have to think about different amounts of money at different 
times, it becomes extremely difficult to do when participants have to consider tradeoffs between 
air quality and money at different points in time. Therefore, although 38% of the participants in 
our matching sample showed negative discount rates, we believe that these were nearly all errors 
in responding.   
 Predicting consequential choices 
 Perhaps most importantly, researchers are interested in understanding real, consequential 
choices that people make. We therefore compared the ability of discount rates from the 
hypothetical scenarios to predict two consequential choices. First, we used the 1-year hyperbolic 
discount rate to predict whether participants would choose to receive $100 today or $200 in the 
future (and some participants were randomly selected and paid out for real money). Due to skew 
and outliers in the distributions, we used the non-parametric Spearman's rho. As seen in Table 2, 
the correlations were always positive, meaning that participants with higher discount rates were 
more likely to choose the immediate $100. The choice based methods clearly outperformed the 
matching method, and this makes intuitive sense: predicting a choice will be easier with a 
choice-based measure than a fill-in-the-blank measure. The better predictive power may also 
stem from the fact that participants found it easier to understand and respond to the choice-based 





We then looked at the ability of these discount rates to predict a real life choice: whether 
participants were a smoker or not. As seen in Table 2, the choice-based methods were sometimes 
able to predict this (with higher discount rates correlated with smoking), while the matching 
method was not. Oddly, the multiple-staircase method was better at predicting smoking rates 
with discount rates for gains, while titration was better at predicting using discount rates for 
losses. We don't have a good explanation for this difference.  
Table 3 
Non-parametric correlations (Spearman's rho) between hypothetical discount rates measured in 
different ways and consequential intertemporal choices. The † symbol indicates p<.1 two-tailed, 
* indicates p<.05, and ** indicates p<.01.  
 
Choosing a $100 
gain now over $200 
in one year 
Smoking 



















These results suggest that researchers who are interested in predicting consequential 
intertemporal choices should employ choice-based methods. It's possible that matching might be 
better for predicting those real-life situations that require the person to name a number, such as 
deciding how much to contribute to a retirement plan, or how quickly to pay down a debt. This 






 Choice-based measures of discounting are a double-edged sword, to be used carefully. 
On one hand, they outperform matching at predicting consequential intertemporal choices. On 
the other hand, the options (and order of options) that researchers use will influence participants' 
answers, so experimental design and interpretation must be done with care. Differences in 
discount rates observed between studies may be attributed to differences in elicitation technique, 
consistent with long-established research on risky choice that has come to the same conclusion 
(Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1971; Tversky, et al., 1988).  
 Overall, discount rates elicited from choice-based methods were higher than those from 
matching, consistent with previous research (Ahlbrecht & Weber, 1997; Frederick, 2003; Read 
& Roelofsma, 2003). We agree with Frederick (2003) that this probably happens because the 
choice based methods implicitly suggest high discount rates to participants, while matching has 
less demand characteristics. However, it should easily be possible to design a study with a 
choice-based measure of discounting that would elicit lower discount rates than matching 
techniques, simply by choosing a range of choice options that is extremely low. When doing 
within-subjects analysis, we found strong order effects; participants gave very different 
responses to the matching questions depending on whether they completed them before or after a 
choice-based method. Therefore, future research on methods should be careful to account for 
this.  
 In in comparison with the standard, fixed-sequence titration method, we did not find 
compelling advantages for the multiple staircase method we developed. This is consistent with 





differences (Rodzon, Berry, & Odum, 2011). In some ways, it is disappointing that our attempt 
to improve measurement was unsuccessful. However, the good news is that the simple titration 
measure, which is much more convenient to implement, still remains one of the best methods.  
While we have focused on choice and matching techniques, because have been most 
commonly used in the literature, it should be noted that many other techniques have recently 
been tested and compared, including intertemporal allocation, evaluations of sequences, and 
intertemporal auctions (Frederick & Loewenstein, 2008; Guyse & Simon, working paper; 
Olivola & Wang, working paper). All of these investigations have found difference in discount 
rates based on the elicitation technique.  
In terms of best practices for studying temporal discounting, our recommendation for 
now is to use the measurement method most congruent with the real-world phenomenon one 
hopes to explain or understand. When in doubt, a choice-based method should be used, because 
it has shown the best predictive power so far. However, care must always be taken when 
considering the choice options presented to participants, as these will undoubtedly influence the 
observed discount rates.  
References 
Ahlbrecht, M., & Weber, M. (1997). An empirical study on intertemporal decision making under 
risk. Management Science, 43(6), 813-826.  
Ariely, D., Loewenstein, G., & Prelec, D. (2003). "Coherent arbitrariness": Stable demand curves 
without stable preferences. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118, 73-105.  
Chabris, C. F., Laibson, D., Morris, C. L., Schuldt, J. P., & Taubinsky, D. (2008). Individual 
laboratory-measured discount rates predict field behavior. Journal of Risk and 
Uncertainty, 37.  
Frederick, S. (2003). Measuring Intergenerational Time Preference: Are Future Lives Valued 
Less? Journal of Risk & Uncertainty, 26, 39-53.  
Frederick, S., & Loewenstein, G. (2008). Conflicting motives in evaluations of sequences. 





Frederick, S., Loewenstein, G., & O'Donoghue, T. (2002). Time discounting and time 
preference: A critical review. Journal of Economic Literature, 40, 351–401.  
Guyse, J. L., & Simon, J. (working paper). Consistency among elicitation techniques for 
intertemporal choice: A within-subjects investigation of the anomalies.  
Hardisty, D. J., & Weber, E. U. (2009). Discounting Future Green: Money Versus the 
Environment. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 138(3), 329-340.  
Johnson, E. J., Haubl, G., & Keinan, A. (2007). Aspects of endowment: A query theory of value. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 33, 461-474.  
Lichtenstein, S., & Slovic, P. (1971). Reversals of preference between bids and choices in 
gambling decisions. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 89(1), 46-55.  
Mazur, J. E. (1987). An adjusting procedure for studying delayed reinforcement. In M. L. 
Commons, J. E. Mazure, J. A. Nevin & H. Rachlin (Eds.), Quantitative analyses of 
behavior: Vol. 5. The effect of delay and intervening events on reinforcement value (pp. 
55-73). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Meier, S., & Sprenger, C. (2010). Present-biased preferences and credit card borrowing. 
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2(1), 193-210.  
Myerson, J., Green, L., & Warusawitharana, M. (2001). Area under the curve as a measure of 
discounting. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 76, 235-243.  
Olivola, C. Y., & Wang, S. W. (working paper). Patience Auctions: The impact of time vs 
money bidding on elicited discount rates.  
Oppenheimer, D. M., Meyvis, T., & Davidenko, N. (2009). Instructional manipulation checks: 
Detecting satisficing to increase statistical power. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 45(4), 867-872.  
Read, D., & Roelofsma, P. (2003). Subadditive versus hyperbolic discounting: A comparison of 
choice and matching. Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes, 91, 140-
153.  
Reimers, S., Maylor, E. A., Stewart, N., & Chater, N. (2009). Associations between a one-shot 
delay discounting measure and age, income education and real-world impulsive behavior. 
Personality and Individual Differences, 47, 973-978.  
Robles, E., & Vargas, P. A. (2008). Parameters of delay discounting assessment: Number of 
trials, effort, and sequential effects. Behavioral Processes, 78(285-290).  
Robles, E., Vargas, P. A., & Bejarano, R. (2009). Within-subject differences in degree of delay 
discounting as a function of order of presentation of hypothetical cash rewards. 
Behavioral Processes, 81, 260-263.  
Rodzon, K., Berry, M. S., & Odum, A. L. (2011). Within-subject comparison of degree of delay 
discounting using titrating and fixed sequence procedures. Behavioural Processes, 86, 
164-167.  
Samuelson, P. (1937). A Note on Measurement of Utility. Review of Economic Studies, 4, 155-
161.  
Tversky, A., Sattath, S., & Slovic, P. (1988). Contingent weighting in judgment and choice. 
Psychological Review, 95(3).  
Weber, E. U., Johnson, E. J., Milch, K. F., Chang, H., Brodscholl, J. C., & Goldstein, D. G. 







Appendix A: Full text of the discounting scenarios 
Financial Gain 
Imagine the city you live in has a budget surplus that it is planning to pay out as rebates of $300 
for each citizen. The city is also considering investing the surplus in endowment funds that will 
mature at different possible times in the future. The funds would allow the city to offer rebates 
of a different amount, to be paid at different possible times in the future. For the purposes of 
answering these questions, please assume that you will not move away from your current city, 
even if that is unlikely to be true in reality.    
Financial Loss 
Imagine the city you live in has a budget shortfall that it is planning to cover through a one-time 
fee of $300 for each citizen. The city is also considering covering the shortfall using fixed-
interest bonds that will mature at different possible times in the future. Offering these bonds 
would require the city to charge the citizens a different amount, to be paid when the bonds 
mature. For the purposes of answering these questions, please assume that you will not move 
away from your current city, even if that is unlikely to be true in reality. 
Environmental Gain 
Imagine the current air quality (measured by number and size of particulates) in your area is 
neither particularly good nor especially bad. The local government has a budget surplus that it 
will either return to the citizens as rebates, or spend to enact various policy and infrastructure 
changes that will lead to a permanent improvement in air quality. Once the changes are put into 






Policy changes will include stricter emissions standards for factories and power plants; the city 
will compensate those factories and power plants for any costs incurred. Infrastructure changes 
will include using a fleet of cleaner-burning, more fuel-efficient vehicles in place of those 
currently used in the public transportation system and by city employees.  
 
We are not interested in how you feel about specific measures meant to improve air quality. 
Rather, we are interested in knowing how much this improved air quality would be worth to you, 
depending on when the change is implemented. The following questions will ask about your 
preference between receiving a sum of money as a rebate now, or having noticeably improved air 
quality starting at different possible times, now or in the future. For the purposes of these 
questions, please assume you will continue to live in your current city, even if that is unlikely to 
be true in reality. 
Environmental Loss 
Imagine the current air quality (measured by number and size of particulates) in your area is 
neither particularly good nor especially bad. The local government has a budget shortfall that it 
will either cover by charging the citizens, or reduce spending on various policy and infrastructure 
repairs, leading to a permanent deterioration in air quality. Once the changes are put into place, 
the air will feel surprisingly dirty and stale.  
 
Policy changes will include weaker emissions standards for factories and power plants; the city 
will earn more in taxes from those factories and power plants, as their profits will increase under 





efficient vehicles in place of those currently used in the public transportation system and by city 
employees.  
 
We are not interested in how you feel about specific measures affecting the air quality. Rather, 
we are interested in knowing how much it would be worth to you to avoid this worsened air 
quality, depending on when the change is implemented. The following questions will ask about 
your preference between paying a sum of money as a one-time fee now, or having noticeably 
worsened air quality starting at different possible times, now or in the future. For the purposes of 
these questions, please assume you will continue to live in your current city, even if that is 
unlikely to be true in reality. 
 
Appendix B: Sample questions from each of the measurement methods and scenario types 
Matching, Financial Gain 
How much would a rebate one year from now have to be in order to make it equally attractive as 
$300 now? 
Please fill in the amount that would make the following options equally attractive. 
A. Receive $300 immediately. 
B. Receive $____ one year from now. 
Matching, Financial Loss 
How much would a tax one year from now have to be in order to make it as unattractive as 





Please fill in the amount that would make the following options equally unattractive. 
A. Pay $300 immediately. 
B. Pay $____ one year from now. 
Titration, Financial Gain 
 
Please choose the option that you prefer in each pair.  
 
What if the rebate were to be paid one year from now? 
A1. Receive $300 immediately    Receive $250 one year from now 
A2. Receive $300 immediately    Receive $475 one year from now 
A3. Receive $300 immediately    Receive $900 one year from now 
A4. Receive $300 immediately    Receive $1,750 one year from now 
A5. Receive $300 immediately    Receive $3,300 one year from now 
A6. Receive $300 immediately    Receive $6,400 one year from now 
A7. Receive $300 immediately    Receive $12,000 one year from now 
A8. Receive $300 immediately    Receive $23,500 one year from now 





A10. Receive $300 immediately    Receive $85,000 one year from now 
 
Titration, Financial Loss 
Please choose the option that you prefer in each pair.  
 
What if the tax were to be paid one year from now? 
A1. Pay $300 immediately    Pay $250 one year from now 
A2. Pay $300 immediately    Pay $475 one year from now 
A3. Pay $300 immediately    Pay $900 one year from now 
A4. Pay $300 immediately    Pay $1,750 one year from now 
A5. Pay $300 immediately    Pay $3,300 one year from now 
A6. Pay $300 immediately    Pay $6,400 one year from now 
A7. Pay $300 immediately    Pay $12,000 one year from now 
A8. Pay $300 immediately    Pay $23,500 one year from now 
A9. Pay $300 immediately    Pay $45,000 one year from now 






Multiple Staircase, Financial Gain 
Which option do you prefer: 
Receive $300 now OR 
Receive $7,700 one 
year from now 
 
Multiple Staircase, Financial Loss 
Which option do you prefer: 
Pay $300 now OR 
Pay $7,736 one year 
from now 
 
Matching, Environmental Gain 
What amount of money now would be as valuable to you as getting improved air quality starting 
one year from now? In other words, how much would a rebate have to be in order to make it 
difficult or impossible for you to choose whether you would prefer getting that amount of money 
immediately or getting the cleaner air in one year?  
Please fill in the amount that would make the following options equally attractive. 
(NOTE: $0 would indicate that improved air quality is worthless to you.) 
A. Improved air quality starting one year from now. 
B. Receive $____ immediately. 





Paying what amount of money now would be as costly to you as suffering worse air quality 
starting one year from now? In other words, how much would a tax have to be in order to make 
it difficult or impossible for you to choose whether you would prefer paying that amount of 
money immediately or suffering the dirty air in one year?  
Please fill in the amount that would make the following options equally unattractive. 
(NOTE: $0 would indicate that air quality is worthless to you.) 
A. Worse air quality starting one year from now. 
B. Pay $____ immediately. 
Titration, Environmental Gain 
What if the improved air quality were to start one year from now? 
B1. Receive $20 immediately.    Permanently improved air quality 
starting one year from now. 
B2. Receive $50 immediately.    Permanently improved air quality 
starting one year from now. 
B3. Receive $130 immediately.    Permanently improved air quality 
starting one year from now. 
B4. Receive $325 immediately.    Permanently improved air quality 
starting one year from now. 
B5. Receive $800 immediately.    Permanently improved air quality 
starting one year from now. 





starting one year from now. 
B7. Receive $5,200 immediately.    Permanently improved air quality 
starting one year from now. 
B8. Receive $13,000 immediately.    Permanently improved air quality 
starting one year from now. 
B9. Receive $33,000 immediately.    Permanently improved air quality 
starting one year from now. 
B10. Receive $85,000 immediately.    Permanently improved air quality 
starting one year from now. 
 
Titration, Environmental Loss 
What if the worse air quality were to start one year from now? 
B1. Pay $20 immediately.    Permanently worse air quality starting 
one year from now. 
B2. Pay $50 immediately.    Permanently worse air quality starting 
one year from now. 
B3. Pay $130 immediately.    Permanently worse air quality starting 
one year from now. 
B4. Pay $325 immediately.    Permanently worse air quality starting 





B5. Pay $800 immediately.    Permanently worse air quality starting 
one year from now. 
B6. Pay $2,100 immediately.    Permanently worse air quality starting 
one year from now. 
B7. Pay $5,200 immediately.    Permanently worse air quality starting 
one year from now. 
B8. Pay $13,000 immediately.    Permanently worse air quality starting 
one year from now. 
B9. Pay $33,000 immediately.    Permanently worse air quality starting 
one year from now. 
B10. Pay $85,000 immediately.    Permanently worse air quality starting 
one year from now. 
 
Multiple Staircase, Environmental Gain 
What if the improved air quality were to start one year from now? 
B1. Receive $20 immediately.    Permanently improved air quality 
starting one year from now. 
B2. Receive $50 immediately.    Permanently improved air quality 
starting one year from now. 
B3. Receive $130 immediately.    Permanently improved air quality 





B4. Receive $325 immediately.    Permanently improved air quality 
starting one year from now. 
B5. Receive $800 immediately.    Permanently improved air quality 
starting one year from now. 
B6. Receive $2,100 immediately.    Permanently improved air quality 
starting one year from now. 
B7. Receive $5,200 immediately.    Permanently improved air quality 
starting one year from now. 
B8. Receive $13,000 immediately.    Permanently improved air quality 
starting one year from now. 
B9. Receive $33,000 immediately.    Permanently improved air quality 
starting one year from now. 
B10. Receive $85,000 immediately.    Permanently improved air quality 
starting one year from now. 
 
Multiple Staircase, Environmental Loss 
What if the worse air quality were to start one year from now? 
B1. Pay $20 immediately.    Permanently worse air quality starting 
one year from now. 
B2. Pay $50 immediately.    Permanently worse air quality starting 





B3. Pay $130 immediately.    Permanently worse air quality starting 
one year from now. 
B4. Pay $325 immediately.    Permanently worse air quality starting 
one year from now. 
B5. Pay $800 immediately.    Permanently worse air quality starting 
one year from now. 
B6. Pay $2,100 immediately.    Permanently worse air quality starting 
one year from now. 
B7. Pay $5,200 immediately.    Permanently worse air quality starting 
one year from now. 
B8. Pay $13,000 immediately.    Permanently worse air quality starting 
one year from now. 
B9. Pay $33,000 immediately.    Permanently worse air quality starting 
one year from now. 
B10. Pay $85,000 immediately.    Permanently worse air quality starting 
one year from now. 
 
Appendix C: The multiple staircase method 
 For the financial scenario, the future amount each staircase was bounded by $250 on the 
low end, and $100,000 on the high end. The immediate amount was always fixed at $300. Each 





roughly 7.5% of the maximum amount ($100,000). This was chosen based on pretesting, 
determining that this would reach indifference points quickly for most participants. The actual 
future amount was jittered by a random amount (up to 1% greater or less than the desired 
amount) and rounded to the nearest dollar so that amounts would not be exactly the same among 
the various staircases. Therefore, the first question most participants saw was something like a 
choice between $300 immediately or $7548 in 1 year.  
 Subsequent questions in each staircase were chosen dynamically based on the 
participant's response to the previous question. The future amount was chosen to be 80% of the 
between the previous amount and the maximum or minimum, as appropriate. For example, if, in 
the first question, the participant preferred $300 today over $7,548 in the future, the next choice 
might be between $300 today and $1,709 in 1 year (again, the future amount is jittered). 
Alternately, if the participant initial preferred the future $7,548 over $300 today, the next 
question might be a choice between $300 today and $81,510 in one year. This 80% method was 
chosen rather than bisection (50%) because it was found based on pretesting that this reached 
indifference points faster: at short delays, most indifference points were relatively low, while at 
long delays indifference points were relatively high, and the 80% method allowed the staircase to 
reach the extremes of the scale more quickly.  
 Each staircase consisted of seven questions chosen in this manner, plus two questions to 
check for attention and/or railroading.
2
 The first check was mean to test for consistency, and was 
chosen by taking the amount from the first question and adding or subtracting 2% to make an 
"easy" question. For example, if the participant initially chose $300 today over $1,709 in one 
                                                          
2
 Railroading would be if a participant made a mistake when answering the first question. If this 





year, the first check might be a choice between $300 today and $1,743. Clearly, the participant 
would be expected to choose the immediate $300 on the check question as well. The second 
check was meant to test whether the participant was always choosing the immediate option or 
always choosing the future option, without thinking. Therefore, the "correct" answer to the 
second check question was always designed to be the opposite of the answer given to the first 
question. This second check question posed the $300 immediate against an extremely large or 
small future amount, as appropriate (it was either the scale minimum divided by 2, or the scale 
maximum times 200). For example, if the participant initially chose $300 today over $1,709 in 
one year, the second check question might ask about $300 today or $20,000,000 in one year. On 
the other hand, if the participant initially chose $1,709 in the future, the second check might ask 
about $300 today vs $125 in the future.  
 Thus, each staircase consisted of nine questions total: seven regular questions, and two 
check questions. The check questions were the fifth and eighth questions, respectively. Pretesting 
indicated that participants enjoyed the check questions because they were easy to answer, giving 
them a break from the questions near their indifference points, which were difficult to answer.  
 The multiple part of the multiple staircase method came from the fact that three different 
scales were interleaved, one for each delay, in random order. So, participants were answering 
questions about 1-year, 10-year, and 50-year delays, in random order.   
 As a sample, here are the options that might be presented to one participant based on their 
choices. Note that each choice was presented one at a time, in contrast to the titration method, 
where all the options were presented on one page. The option the hypothetical  participant 





X Receive $300 now OR Receive $7,786 fifty years from now 
   Receive $300 now OR Receive $7,771 one year from now   X 
   Receive $300 now OR Receive $7,737 ten years from now X 
X Receive $300 now OR Receive $1,739 ten years from now 
   Receive $300 now OR Receive $1,764 one year from now X 
X Receive $300 now OR Receive $82,087 fifty years from now 
X Receive $300 now OR Receive $548 one year from now 
   Receive $300 now OR Receive Receive $6,574 ten years from now X 
   Receive $300 now OR Receive $96,620 fifty years from now X 
X Receive $300 now OR Receive $2,690 ten years from now 
X Receive $300 now OR Receive $311 one year from now 
   Receive $300 now OR Receive $85,257 fifty years from now X 
X Receive $300 now OR Receive $5,747 fifty years from now 
   Receive $300 now OR Receive $9,688 one year from now X 
   Receive $300 now OR Receive $9,708 ten years from now X 
   Receive $300 now OR Receive $3,501 ten years from now X 





   Receive $300 now OR Receive $84,733 fifty years from now X 
   Receive $300 now OR Receive $513 one year from now X 
   Receive $300 now OR Receive $82,385 fifty years from now X 
   Receive $300 now OR Receive $2,845 ten years from now X 
X Receive $300 now OR Receive $125 one year from now 
   Receive $300 now OR Receive $20,176,000 fifty years from now X 
X Receive $300 now OR Receive $126 ten years from now 
X Receive $300 now OR Receive $2,832 ten years from now  
   Receive $300 now OR Receive $81,424 fifty years from now X 
X Receive $300 now OR Receive $478 one year from now 
 The environmental multiple staircase was identical to the financial multiple staircase, but 
with two changes. The first was that there were four staircases (immediate, 1-year, 10-year, and 
50-year) rather than three. The other was that the minimum amount was set to $0, based on 
pretesting which found that some participants placed a very low willingness-to-pay or 
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In three studies, participants made choices between hypothetical financial, environmental, and 
health gains and losses that took effect either immediately or with a delay of 1 or 10 years. In all 
three domains, choices indicated that gains were discounted more than losses. There were no 
significant differences in the discounting of monetary and environmental outcomes, but health 
gains were discounted more and health losses were discounted less than gains or losses in the 
other two domains. Correlations between implicit discount rates for these different choices 
suggest that discount rates are influenced more by the valence of outcomes (gains vs. losses) than 
by domain (money, environment, or health). Overall, results indicate that when controlling as 
many factors as possible, at short to medium delays, environmental outcomes are discounted in a 





Discounting future green: Money versus the environment 
 The future is less important than the present. This is the story told both by rational, 
economic models of how we should deal with delayed outcomes and by descriptive, 
psychological models of how we actually deal with them. This makes sense for many reasons. 
For example, getting $250 today is generally worth more than getting $300 in ten years (even 
adjusting for inflation) because the immediate $250 could be invested in the meantime, and 
would yield more than $300 with accumulated interest after 10 years. Time delay also introduces 
a host of uncertainties that reduce the value of the promised outcome in a similar way to 
probabilistic receipt of outcomes in a lottery. You might die before the ten years have passed, or 
the institution that was promising the $300 may no longer exist in ten years' time. Furthermore, 
psychological factors such as impatience or lack of self control also pay a role, i.e., you may 
want to get the money right away ("pure time preference"). The rate at which future outcomes 
are devalued is known as the discount rate.  
Understanding the factors that affect discounting is critical for analysis of decisions 
involving tradeoffs between present and future benefits (or costs). For example, at the individual 
level, prudent pension investment choices are often inhibited by temporal near-sightedness 
(Thaler & Benartzi, 2004). At a policy level, leading economists assert that "the biggest 
uncertainty of all in the economics of climate change is the uncertainty about which interest rate 
to use for discounting" (Weitzman, 2007). While much of this debate has evolved around the 
philosophical and ethical issues that might dictate what discount rate(s) should be used to make 
cost-benefit calculations for different courses of action in such policy contexts, behavioral 
research on the actual discount rates implicit in people’s intertemporal decisions is necessary to 





environmental gains and losses and how they will thus react to public policy proposals. What are 
the best ways to help people save more for retirement, lose weight, or preserve a healthy 
environment for their children?  
Rational, economic models of discounting dictate that all future outcomes should be 
discounted at a continuously compounded, exponential rate. This rate is generally chosen based 
on the rate of return on conservative investments available in the financial markets, something 
around 6%. This rate incorporates uncertainty, potential opportunity costs, and the increasing 
standard of living (including technological advancement). All goods and services (including 
health, air quality, etc) are considered potentially tradable with money, thus all future outcomes 
should be discounted at the same rate.  
 In contrast to this economic model, many other factors typically drive people's actual 
evaluation of future outcomes. The most notable is a strong desire, all other things being equal, 
to get things now (aka positive pure time preferences or temporal myopia). This present bias 
leads to a hyperbolic pattern of discounting in both human and non-human animals (Mazur, 
1987; Frederick, Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, 2002), such that we discount at a relatively 
greater rate (per unit of time) when considering short delays than when considering longer ones. 
Recently, this pattern of discounting is thought to result from two neural processing systems, so-
called beta and delta systems (McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein & Cohen, 2004; McClure, 
Ericson, Laibson, Loewenstein & Cohen, 2007; Viscusi, Huber & Bell, 2008), although other 
results are more consistent with a single system (Glimcher & Kable, 2007; Kable & Glimcher, 
2007). The beta system represents our emotional, affect based preference for immediate 





discounting of future outcomes (per unit of delay) based on uncertainty and (projected) increased 
future resources.  
 In addition to present bias, several other robust "irrational" phenomena have been 
documented in descriptive studies (for a review, see Frederick et al., 2002): people discount 
gains more than losses (the "sign effect", Thaler, 1981), discount large outcomes less than small 
ones (the "magnitude effect," Thaler, 1981), and discount more when the default is to receive 
something now than when the default is to receive it later (the "accelerate-delay" asymmetry, 
Loewenstein, 1988; Weber et al., 2007). We also prefer improving sequences to declining ones 
with the same average (Hsee, Abelson & Salovey, 1991; Loewenstein & Sicherman, 1991), and 
prefer to spread positive experiences out over time rather than experience them all immediately 
(Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993).  
Domain Differences in Time Preferences?  
While the vast majority of studies of discounting have examined preferences for financial 
gains (ie, receipt of a $1000 now or in a year’s time), little is known about whether the models 
and insights developed from this line of research apply equally well to other domains (ie, better 
air quality in a year’s time). Rational-economic models assume explicitly and many behavioral 
models assume implicitly that while discount rates may vary between individuals, reflecting their 
differing time preferences, a given individual or government should and does use the same 
discount rate for future outcomes in different domains. Yet despite the fact that government 
offices often attempt to set a single official discount rate for use in evaluating all long term 
projects and investments (Lind, 1982; Her_Majesty's_Treasury, 2004; Lebègue, Hirtzman & 
Baumstark, 2005), in practice government agencies often use different discount rates in different 





although "differing discount rates may be the result of government and agency policy 
manipulation by narrow interest groups… it is equally possible that the general public will is 
being correctly expressed…" (p 416).  
A parallel can be drawn from intertemporal choice to risky choice, where the dominant 
rational-economic assumption continues to be that risk attitude (i.e., the discounting of an 
outcome as a function of how likely or unlikely it is expected to occur) can vary between 
individuals, but that a given individual should exhibit the same level of risk aversion to outcomes 
in all domains (after adjusting for differences in the marginal value of outcomes in different 
domains). Contrary to that assumption, however, it has become well established empirically that 
the risk attitudes of individuals differ quite strongly across different domains (Weber, Blais & 
Betz, 2002). Preferences are multiply determined, and these multiple factors (such as domain 
familiarity, cultural norms for risk taking, etc) vary by domain. In the small number of studies 
that have examined temporal discounting for outcomes other than in the financial domain 
(contrasting them to health outcomes), domain dependencies of various sorts have also been 
reported (Chapman, 1996a; b; 2003). Recent theoretical developments also suggest that different 
goals (e,g., financial vs. social, vs. environmental goals) may be discounted at different rates 
(Krantz & Kunreuther, 2007).  
 A few previous studies have examined the discounting of environmental outcomes and 
made comparisons to the discounting of financial outcomes, but did not control for possible 
confounding factors. For example, Bohm & Pfister (2005) report data suggesting that temporal 
discounting is lower for environmental outcomes than for financial outcomes. Their scenarios 
presented participants with potential environmental losses to be incurred by others, whereas the 





the participant him/herself. The low discount rates observed may thus have been due to the 
difference in valence (as gains are typically discounted more than losses, Thaler, 1981) or the 
difference between who was affected by the consequences (others vs. self). Similarly, in a brief 
review of temporal discounting studies, Gattig & Hendrickx (2007) conclude that discounting is 
less pronounced for environmental risks than for other domains, noting that a substantial 
proportion of participants (in the range of 30% to 50%) do not discount environmental risks at 
all. However, none of the papers reviewed directly compared monetary and environmental 
outcomes nor did they control for potentially confounding factors such as the valence of 
outcomes.  
Why is the valence of outcomes important? Just as risk attitudes differ between gain and 
loss decisions (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), with risk aversion for 
gains and risk seeking for losses, so has discounting been found to differ for outcomes that are 
seen as gains and those seen as losses. For desirable outcomes, immediate receipt is attractive 
and delaying immediate receipt needs to be compensated. For undesirable outcomes (like traffic 
tickets), immediate receipt is unattractive and thus people should be willing to pay a premium to 
put such events off, discounting the delayed payment of traffic fines in the same way they would 
discount the delayed receipt of gift certificates. However, observed discount rates for losses are 
typically far smaller than those for gains (Thaler, 1981; Frederick et al., 2002), presumably 
because additional factors are at play, such as the desire to get the unpleasant event out of the 
way, rather than having it hanging over one’s head (Loewenstein, 1987). Note that a positive 
time preference -- desiring to experience something now rather than later, all other things being 






 To the best of our knowledge, only one empirical study has controlled for the sign of 
outcomes when comparing intertemporal preferences for monetary and environmental outcomes 
(Guyse, Keller & Eppel, 2002). It found that graduate business students preferred increasing 
(graphically represented) sequences of air and water quality but decreasing sequences for 
income. However, as the authors note, business school students are trained in net present value 
computations and know that the "right" answer for monetary sequences is to prefer the 
decreasing profile (with the highest initial payout). Thus, this population may not be 
representative of the general public.  
 Given the lack of research directly comparing discounting of monetary and 
environmental outcomes, one may look to discounting of other non-monetary domains, such as 
health, for evidence that nonmonetary dimensions like environmental outcomes may be 
discounted differently. Based on a series of studies, Chapman (2003) concluded that although on 
average, across respondents and conditions, mean discount rates for money and health outcomes 
were similar, and the same contextual factors known to influence financial discount rates (length 
of delay, and magnitude and valence of outcomes) also affected the discount rates for health 
outcomes (Chapman & Elstein, 1995; Chapman, 1996a; b), discount rates were, in fact, domain 
dependent. In particular, Chapman found that correlations of discount rates within a domain 
(roughly .6 to .8) were typically higher than correlations of discount rates between domains (.1 to 
.4). In other words, if someone steeply discounted a small financial gain delayed by one year, 
that person was likely to discount other financial gains (of different amounts, at different delays) 
relatively steeply as well. In contrast, this same person might discount health outcomes much 
less steeply (while the opposite pattern could be true for someone else).  





In order to investigate possible domain differences in time preference, it is necessary to 
control for the multiple factors that typically distinguish intertemporal decisions involving 
environmental outcomes from those involving monetary outcomes. Specifically, environmental 
outcomes typically affect multiple people (rather than only the decision-maker), on a longer 
time-scale (sometimes exceeding the lifetime of the decision maker), and are often less familiar 
and more ambiguous than typical monetary outcomes. Furthermore, environmental outcomes 
often result in semi-permanent changes in the state of the world (changes in what economists 
would call streams of consumption) rather than a one-time consumption event. In other words, as 
typically studied in laboratory studies, the utility from receiving a monetary reward is assumed to 
be experienced at one point in time, whereas the utility from an environmental outcome such as 
an improvement in water quality or the extinction of a species is often experienced over a long 
period of time.  
 The present research endeavored to examine domain differences while controlling for 
these confounding factors as much as possible. The values of environmental goods are often 
measured (and the implicit discount rate inferred) by "pricing them out" through contingent 
valuation (Mitchell & Carson, 1989), which relies on the perception of respondents that 
environmental outcomes can be easily valued in and exchanged for dollars (and vice versa). 
However, this may not be a valid assumption (Gregory, Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1993; Schkade & 
Payne, 1994; Frederick, 2006). For example, when asked to assign a monetary value (e.g., their 
willingness-to-pay) to some environmental consequence, respondents often express the strength 
of their attitudes (protecting the environment is important), or express what they consider a fair 
contribution, rather than communicating the result of a cost/benefit analysis reflecting the 





rates assessed through contingent valuation may be very misleading. In contrast, and following 
the methodology of the health discounting literature, the studies we present here assessed 
discount rates using within domain measures.  
Study 1 
 In the first study, we compared discounting of monetary gains and losses with 
discounting of four environmental scenarios: air quality gains, air quality losses, mass transit 
gains, and garbage pileups (a loss). Choices in all cases involved an immediate option and an 
option with a one-year time delay. Efforts were made to control for commonly confounded 
factors, including timescale, uncertainty, who was affected (although discount rates in 
hypothetical scenarios for oneself and others may not differ in any case, see Cairns & van der 
Pol, 1999; Pronin, Olivola & Kennedy, 2008), and one-time consumption vs. a change in 
consumption streams.  
 In making our predictions, we faced a conflict between two theoretic traditions. While 
classic economic models (Samuelson, 1937) assert that financial and environmental outcomes 
should be discounted at the same rate, more recent psychological theories contend that different 
domains prime diverse goals (e.g., material, social, moral-ethical) with different intertemporal 
preferences (Krantz & Kunreuther, 2007; Weber, In Press). Do common mechanisms underlie 
the valuation of all future events? Or is the extensive research on discounting of economic gains 
inapplicable to discounting of environmental outcomes? After all, while the most common 
rationale for discounting economic gains is the possibility of investment in the marketplace, 
many people believe that, as an ethical matter, environmental benefits should not lose value 





 These domain differences in opportunities for alternative investment and ethical 
considerations led us to predict that environmental outcomes would be discounted less than 
financial outcomes, consistent with previous findings and conjectures (Svenson & Karlsson, 
1989; Nicolaij & Hendrickx, 2003; Gattig & Hendrickx, 2007). We also hypothesized that 
within-domain discount rates would be more highly correlated than between-domain discount 
rates, based on Chapman's domain dependence findings (Chapman & Elstein, 1995; Chapman, 
1996a; b; Chapman, Nelson & Hier, 1999; Chapman, 2003). In other words, if you wanted to 
know how much someone valued future environmental gains, it would be difficult to predict 
based only on knowing how much she valued future financial gains, presumably because time 
preferences may be different in each domain.  
Method 
 Participants. 90 participants were recruited online via classified ads for a study on 
decision making, and were compensated $8 for their participation. We excluded the data from 6 
participants who did not complete the study, from 3 participants who completed the study in less 
than 10 minutes (mean completion time was 31 minutes), and data from 16 participants whose 
responses to the titration items (described below) switched back and forth more than once, or 
switched in a manner that would only make sense if they preferred more losses or less gains (i.e., 
preferring $150 now to $250 in one year yet also preferring $230 in one year to $150 now). All 
further analyses area based on the 65 remaining participants.
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Participants were 66% female, with an average age of 31 (SD = 9.2). 52% were married, 
and 54% had children. 27% were students, 62% had a college degree of some kind, and the 





 Procedure. After answering questions for an unrelated study, participants considered 
hypothetical financial and environmental scenarios in which they made a series of choices 
between immediate and future outcomes (for example, a choice between receiving $250 today or 
receiving $370 one year in the future). All participants responded to four scenarios: two 
monetary scenarios (one gain, one loss), and two environmental scenarios (one gain, one loss), in 
counterbalanced order. For the environmental scenarios, participants randomly completed either 
two air quality scenarios (gain and loss) or a mass transit improvement (gain) scenario and 
garbage pile-up (loss) scenario. Finally, all participants provided demographic details. Thus, the 
study had a 2 (gain vs loss: within) X 2 (monetary vs environmental: within) X 2 (air quality vs 
transit & garbage: between) design.  
Monetary Gain Scenario. Participants read the text, "Imagine you just won a lottery, 
worth $250, which will be paid to you immediately. However, the lottery commission is giving 
you the option of receiving a different amount, paid to you one year from now." They then 
answered 10 binary choice questions, where they chose between winning $250 immediately or 
winning $410 (or $390, or $370, etc) one year in the future. This titration procedure was used to 
elicit the point at which participants were indifferent between present and future gains. For this 
and all other titration measures, the scale went from roughly 1.6 to .9 times the present value (for 
example, $410 to $230). Following the titration, participants answered the following question: 
"Please fill in the number that would make you indifferent between the following two options: A. 
Win $250 immediately. B. Win $___ one year from now." A single indifference point for each 
participant was obtained from titration using the point at which he or she switched from 
preferring the future option to preferring the present option, unless the participant maxed out the 





Monetary Loss Scenario. Participants were told to imagine they got a parking fine which 
they could pay immediately or one year in the future. Similar titration and free response 
questions were used to determine the indifference point between immediate and future payment.  
Air Gain & Loss Scenarios. Participants were told to imagine the local county 
government was considering a temporary change to its emissions policy to study the effects of 
air quality on human health and the local wildlife. The particulate output of nearby factories and 
power plants would be immediately reduced [increased] for a period of three weeks, after which 
time the air quality would return to its former level, but the government was also considering 
making the change one year in the future, for a different length of time. Titration and free 
response items were used as before, with choices such as "Improved air quality immediately for 
21 days, or improved air quality one year from now for 35 days." Participants were asked to 
consider only their personal preference (for improved [worse] air quality immediately or in the 
future) as they made their choices. Subsequently, to get a sense of how much they valued the air 
quality relative to the money, participants were asked whether they would choose to gain [lose] 
$250 or would choose improved [worse] air quality for 21 days.  
Mass Transit (gain) Scenario. Participants were told to imagine the local transit authority 
had a temporary budget surplus which they were required to spend in the next 18 months, which 
would be used to improve the frequency, hours, and cleanliness of buses, trains, and subways. 
Furthermore, as more people would be expected to use mass transit, traffic congestion would 
also be reduced, benefiting those who drive cars or bicycles. The transit authority planned to 
implement the improvement immediately for 60 days, but was also considering doing it one year 
in the future for a different length of time. Participants responded to titration and free response 





participants chose between receiving $250 immediately or having improved transit immediately 
for 60 days.  
Garbage Pile-Up (loss) Scenario. Participants were told to imagine the local sanitation 
workers union was planning to strike, which would lead to garbage and litter piling up on the 
streets and a bad smell. The union was planning to strike immediately for 21 days but was also 
considering striking one year in the future, for a different length of time. As before, titration and 
free response measures were used and participants were asked to consider only their personal 
preference. Subsequently, participants chose between paying $250 immediately or having 
garbage in the streets for 21 days.  
Results 
As described above, a combination of titration and free response measures were used to 
obtain a single indifference point for each scenario. To enable comparisons between scenarios 
and domains, these indifference points were converted to discount parameters using the 
hyperbolic discounting formula V = A / (1+kD), where V = present value, A = future amount, D 
is the delay (typically in years), and k is a fitted parameter. This equation can be solved for k, the 
discount parameter that indicates how much someone values future outcomes relative to present 
outcomes. A k of zero means the present and future are valued equally. Positive values of k 
indicate that future outcomes are discounted (the more so, the larger k), meaning that decision 
maker prefers to receive gains now rather than later, or prefers to receive losses later rather than 
now. Negative values of k, on the other hand, indicate negative discounting, meaning that the 
decision maker prefers to receive gains later rather than now, or prefers to receive losses now 
rather than later. We chose this hyperbolic model because of its simplicity, considerable 





1997; Frederick et al., 2002), and relatively balanced treatment of positive and negative time 
preference (unlike an exponential discounted utility transformation, which minimizes extreme 
positive discounting but magnifies extreme negative discounting).  
Mean discount parameters for each of the 6 scenarios are summarized in Figure 1. The 
smaller standard error bars in Figure 1 for the monetary scenarios partly reflect the fact that the 
number of observations (n = 65) is twice as large as for the air quality (n = 31) and other 
environmental (n = 34) scenarios.  
Figure 1. 
Mean discount parameters for monetary and environmental gains and losses in Study 1. Error 

























Participants discounted monetary gains, k = 0.35 (SD = 0.32), more than losses, k = 0.06 
(SD = 0.17), a significant difference, t(64)=6.0, p < .001, corresponding to a large effect size, d = 
4.6. In more concrete terms, participants indicated that getting $250 now was roughly equivalent 
to getting $337.50 in one year, while losing $250 now was only equivalent to losing $265 in one 
year. Similarly, participants discounted air quality gains, k = 0.45 (SD = 0.56), more than losses, 
k = 0.08 (SD = 0.29), t(30)=3.7, p = .001, and discounted mass transit improvement, k = 0.49 
(SD = 0.95), more than garbage pile-ups, k = .09 (SD = 0.43), t(33)=2.4, p < .05. For example, 
participants would prefer 31 days (or more) of better air quality in one year's time to 21 days of 
immediately better air quality, but would only prefer 23 days (or less) of future worse air quality 
to 21 days of immediately worse air quality. Although no significant differences were found in 
pair-wise comparisons of gains or losses between domains, the large standard deviations and low 
sample sizes meant that we only had sufficient power (.80) to detect fairly large differences (d = 
1.2 or larger), so we could neither reject the null hypothesis nor conclude that there weren't any 
meaningful differences between domains.  
A 2 (valence: positive or negative) x 2 (domain: monetary vs environmental) repeated-
measures ANOVA confirmed the main effect of valence, F(1,64) = 28.3, p < .001, but not 
domain, F(1,64) = 2.2, p = .14, or the interaction, F(1,64) = 1.2, p = .27. Entering order effects 
into the model revealed that although the order of presentation of domain had no effect, 
participants discounted significantly more (for both domains and for gains and losses) when 
gains were presented first, F(1,63) = 7.5, p < .01. Entering age as a covariate, an (unpredicted) 
age by valence interaction indicated that older individuals responded to valence more strongly, 
discounting gains more and losses less, F(1,63) = 9.07, p < .01. Gender, marital status, number 





For comparison with previous studies which reported high rates of non-discounting for 
environmental scenarios, we computed the proportion of zero or negative discounting in each 
domain. While few individuals (see proportions in parentheses) exhibited zero or negative 
discounting for monetary (.00), air quality (.03), or mass transit (.06) gains, a substantial 
proportion displayed this pattern of preferences for monetary (.28), air quality (.35), and garbage 
(.35) losses. While differences between proportions for gains and losses were significant (all 
pair-wise comparisons significant at p < .01 or better), there were no (within-valence) differences 
between domains. Thus, while almost no one was indifferent to date of receipt of rewards or 
preferred to receive them later rather than now, a substantial number of participants preferred to 
incur losses immediately rather than later or were indifferent with respect to when the loss 
occurred. Even when removing zero and negative discounting values from the results, the sign 
effect remains significant (and also in Studies 2 and 3).  
As seen in Table 1, discounting of monetary gains was correlated with discounting of air 
quality gains and transit gains, while discounting of monetary losses was correlated with 
discounting of air quality losses and garbage pile-ups (note that discounting of air quality could 
not be correlated with discounting of transit and garbage, as this was a between-subjects 
manipulation). Discount rates for gains and losses within each domain were not significantly 
correlated. In other words, discount rates were correlated for same-valence items but not 
different-valence items, regardless of domain.  
Table 1 
Pearson correlations of discount parameters for gains and losses in monetary and environmental 
outcomes, in Study 1. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01 





$+ -.2     
air- .38* .23    
air+ -.19 .68** .25   
garbage- .41* .46**    
transit+ -.13 .41*   .15 
Only 10% of participants said they would prefer the immediate improved air quality for 
21 days over receiving $250, while 42% said they would rather pay $250 than have worse air 
quality for 21 days. Similarly, 15% reported preferring 60 days of improved mass transit to the 
$250, and 35% said they would rather pay the $250 rather than have 21 days of garbage in the 
streets. These differences in choice proportions suggest that the degree of loss aversion (i.e., the 
observation that losses of a given magnitude hurt more than gains of the same magnitude provide 
pleasure) described by prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) was, in fact, stronger for 
the environmental outcomes than for financial outcomes (the gain or payment of $250), 
consistent with other studies (Novemsky & Kahneman, 2005). 
Discussion 
 When presented with monetary and environmental gain and loss scenarios that were written to 
control confounding factors, participants discounted gains substantially more than losses but did not 
discount environmental outcomes significantly more or less than monetary outcomes. The valence 
difference was stronger between subjects; participants who were presented with gains first tended to 
discount all outcomes more overall, likely exhibiting greater discounting for gains and then endeavoring 
to remain somewhat consistent in their responses to other scenarios. Thus, in support of economic 
theories, it appears that time preference was similar for monetary and environmental outcomes.  
 As in previous studies on discounting of environmental losses, a substantial number of 





proportion of participants showed this preference for monetary losses, thus suggesting that the pattern of 
results observed in previous studies may have been due more to the valence of the outcomes than the 
domain. Reinforcing this perspective, very few participants displayed zero or negative discounting of 
environmental gains. Recall that for losses, negative discounting implies that a participant would rather 
experience a larger, sooner loss than a smaller, later loss.  
 As in previous studies, discounting was moderately correlated between domains. This means that 
knowing how much someone valued future monetary gains relative to immediate monetary gains allows 
one to predict how much that participant valued future environmental gains relative to immediate 
environmental gains. However, correlations between discounting of gains and losses were quite low, so 
knowing how much someone discounted environmental gains tells little about how much they discounted 
environmental losses. In summary, the correlation data suggest that at both the individual subject level 
and averaged across subjects, discounting is influenced quite strongly by the valence of outcomes but not 
so much by their domain.  
Study 2 
 While the lack of significant differences between environmental and monetary domains was 
somewhat surprising, null results are always difficult to interpret. We therefore ran a second study, with 
several objectives. Most importantly, we wanted to see if our null results with respect to domain 
differences would replicate with greater statistical power. One way of demonstrating such power was to 
replicate other domain differences previously demonstrated in prior research. In Study 2, we therefore 
compared the discounting of monetary and environmental outcomes with the discounting of health 
outcomes. Previous research has demonstrated that at short delays (1 year or less) health gains are 
discounted more than monetary gains (Chapman & Elstein, 1995; Chapman, 1996b; Chapman et al., 
1999) while health losses are discounted less than monetary losses (Chapman, 1996b). What drives this 





positive time preference (the "beta system" in quasi-hyperbolic models). This greater desire to have things 
now then translates into greater discount rates for gains and lower discount rates for losses, relative to the 
more abstract financial and environmental scenarios.  
The second objective of Study 2, then, was to establish whether the lack of difference in 
discounting between monetary and environmental outcomes observed in Study 1 was due to 
idiosyncrasies of the (fairly abstract) scenarios employed or was a more general effect. Towards this end, 
we designed new air quality scenarios, using a standard, real world measure of air quality, and we 
recruited participants from areas with poor air quality. Through these measures, we hoped to generalize 
the results of Study 1 to an environmental scenario that might be more realistic to knowledgeable 
participants.  
 Finally, the third objective of Study 2 was to explore the role of individual differences in 
predicting discounting of environmental outcomes. Previous research has demonstrated that scores on the 
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) predict discounting of monetary gains but not of positive or negative 
health events such as getting a massage or submitting to dental work (Frederick, 2005). The CRT is meant 
to measure the ability to inhibit fast but inaccurate answers to questions such as "A bat and a ball cost 
$1.10. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? ___ cents." Presumably, 
people who are able to (or enjoy) carefully reflecting on the CRT questions are also more willing to wait 
for monetary rewards. In contrast, the CRT does not predict time preferences for health events, 
presumably because these preferences are relatively more affectively (rather than cognitively) driven. We 
therefore administered the three-item CRT to participants to see whether it would predict discounting of 
monetary and environmental gains but not health outcomes.  
Method 
 Participants. 167 participants were recruited from the 10 ZIP-codes in the country with 





mainly from California and Arizona. Participants were recruited and paid in the same manner as 
Study 1. Using the same criteria as Study 1, data were dropped from 6 non-completers, 6 who 
completed the study in less than 10 minutes (mean completion time was 38 minutes), and 37 
participants who failed our careful-response criteria, leaving 118 participants for analysis. 
Participants were 55% female, with an average age of 38 (SD = 13). 49% were married, 
and 50% had children. 13% were students, 85% had a college degree of some kind, and the 
median household income was $50,000 - $99,999. 75% of participants indicated they had heard 
of the AQI prior to the study, but only 40% were familiar with it. 97% of participants indicated 
they had experienced changes in air quality.  
Procedure. All participants responded to 6 scenarios: monetary gain & loss, air quality 
gain & loss, and health gain & loss. Order was partially counterbalanced, such that the three 
scenarios in each valence (gain or loss) were always presented together, with the gain scenarios 
appearing first half of the time. While the ordering of the air and health scenarios was balanced 
(appearing either first or third), the monetary scenario was always presented second in each 
group. After responding to the scenarios, participants answered questions about their experience 
with each domain and demographic questions, and completed the CRT (Frederick, 2005).  
Monetary Gain & Loss Scenarios. Although the basic scenarios were the same as those 
used in Study 1, the ordering and formatting of the titration options were changed to a format 
that seemed more natural. Also, the free response questions asked participants to "fill in the 
number that makes the following two options equally [un]attractive" rather than using the Study 
1 language "fill in the number that would make you indifferent between the following two 






Air Gain & Loss Scenarios. Although the air quality cover stories were similar to those 
used in Study 1, the dependant variable was different. The Air Quality Index (AQI), a 0 to 500 
continuous air quality measure employed by the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (2003), 
was used to specify different degrees of improvement or deterioration in air quality. AQI 
forecasts are reported in the weather sections of newspapers in polluted areas (such as the LA 
Times), so it was plausible that participants would already be familiar with it. Before the first air 
quality scenario, a one page explanation of the AQI was presented to all participants. In the loss 
scenario, participants were told to imagine that the local AQI average was 90 (in the "moderate" 
range -- note that higher numbers signify more pollutants), and a temporary emissions policy 
change would worsen air quality either immediately or one year in the future. Titration and free 
response measures were again used, with choices such as "40 point deterioration in air quality, 
starting immediately, or 64 point deterioration in air quality, starting 1 year from now." In the 
gain scenario, participants were told to imagine the local AQI average was 130, and air quality 
would be improved by 40 points (or a different amount in one year). As the best possible AQI 
value is 0, the maximum possible improvement was therefore 130, so participants' indifference 
points for gains (and hence discount rates) had a ceiling. As in Study 1, participants were also 
asked to choose between gaining [losing] $250 and better [worse] air quality for 3 weeks.  
Health Gain Scenario. In a scenario adapted from Chapman (1996b), participants were 
told to imagine they were in poor health and could choose between two treatments, one of which 
would take effect immediately and result in health improvements for a specified length of time or 
another which would take effect one year in the future and last a different (generally longer) 
amount of time. Although Chapman (Chapman, 1996b) used health improvements lasting 1 to 8 





these would be valued more closely to the outcomes in the monetary and air quality scenarios. 
Again, titration and free response measures were used to assess indifference points between 
immediate and later choice options and to infer the discount parameter k. As with the other 
scenarios, participants also chose between gaining $250 and having improved health for 12 
weeks.  
Health Loss Scenario. In this scenario, also adapted from Chapman (1996b), participants 
were told to imagine they were in full health and could choose between two diseases, one of 
which would take effect immediately and last for 12 weeks and the other which would take effect 
in one year but last longer. Questions and amounts were equivalent to those used for the health 
gain scenario.  
Results 
As mentioned above, the air quality gain scenario used only allowed for a maximum 
discount parameter of k = 2.25 (equivalent to a one-year discount rate of 69%). To fairly 
compare discounting across scenarios and domains, we therefore capped all discount parameters 
at 2.25 or -2.25. In other words, any score beyond that range was set to 2.25 or -2.25, as 
appropriate. Six percent of scores were capped in this way.  
Mean discount parameters for each of the 6 scenarios are shown in Figure 2. As in Study 
1, gains were discounted significantly more than losses, with all gain/loss t-tests highly 
significant and effect sizes of d = 1.6 to 2.0. Also as in Study 1, air quality gains were not 
discounted significantly differently from monetary gains (although there was a trend for 
monetary gains to be discounted more), nor were air losses discounted significantly differently 
from monetary losses. In contrast, health gains, k = 0.77 (SD = 0.88), were discounted 





quality gains k = 0.45 (SD = 0.52), t(117) = 4.0, p < .001. Furthermore, health losses, k = -0.01 
(SD = 0.44), were discounted less than monetary losses, k = 0.07 (SD = 0.23), t(117) = 2.1, p < 
.05, and air quality losses, k = 0.13 (SD = 0.37), t(117) = 2.9, p < .01. However, these differences 
were only modest, with effect sizes ranging from d = 0.2 to 0.5, i.e., substantially smaller than 
effect sizes for outcome valence. Although not predicted, discount rates for monetary gains were 
significantly higher in Study 2 than in Study 1, t(170) = 2.9, p < .01. 
Figure 2. 
Mean discount parameters for monetary, air quality and health gains and losses in Study 2. 


























In more concrete terms, participants were on average indifferent between gaining $250 
immediately or $395 in one year, losing $250 immediately or losing $267.5 in one year, a 40 
point improvement in air quality immediately or 58 points in one year, a 40 point deterioration in 
air quality immediately or 45.2 points in one year, 12 weeks of improved health immediately or 
21.2 in one year, and 12 weeks of worse health immediately or 11.9 in one year.  
A 2 (valence: positive or negative) x 3 (domain: monetary vs air quality vs. health) 
repeated-measures ANOVA confirmed the main effect of valence, F(1,117)=114.4, p < .001, 
indicating that gains were discounted more than losses, and the valence by domain interaction, 
F(2,116)=12.7, p < .001, indicating that the effect of valence was greater for health outcomes. 
Upon entering order effects into the model, participants discounted significantly more when 
gains were presented first, F(1,111)=18.0, p < .001, as in Study 1. Entering age as a covariate, 
the valence by age interaction (observed in Study 1) was not significant, F(1,114) = 1.7, p = .19, 
but showed a trend in the same direction. Gender, marital status, number of children, education, 
occupation, and income each had no significant effect. 
 CRT data was missing from 3 participants due to a technical error. Entering the CRT as a 
covariate in the ANOVA revealed a main effect of CRT, F(1,113) = 5.0, p < .05, indicating that 
individuals who scored higher discounted less, and a CRT by valence interaction, F(1,113) = 5.7, p < .05, 
indicating that while higher CRT scores were associated with less discounting of gains, there was no 
relationship between CRT and discounting of losses. In other words, if participants were intelligent and 
patient enough to give correct answers on the CRT, they were also likely to be patient for future gains and 
thus value present and future gains more equally, yet they were no more or less likely than average to 
want to postpone losses. While simple GLMs confirmed the power of CRT to predict discounting of 
monetary gains, F(1,114) = 4.8, p < .05, no relationship was found between CRT and discounting of 





thus replicating prior research (Frederick, 2005). Also, the CRT predicted discounting of air quality gains, 
F(1,114) = 12.7, p < .01.  
Similar to Study 1, only a small proportion of individuals exhibited zero or negative 
discounting for monetary (.03), air quality (.10), or health transit (.07) gains, while a substantial 
proportion displayed this pattern of preferences for monetary (.29), air quality (.25), and health 
(.43) losses. Differences in these proportions between gains and losses were all significant at p < 
.01 or better. Also, zero or negative discounting occurred more often in response to the health 
loss scenario than the monetary loss, p < .05, or air loss scenarios, p < .01. It is important to note, 
however, that discount parameters for losses were more or less normally distributed (in all three 
studies), so (non) effects such as the inability of the CRT to predict discount rates for losses were 
not due merely to a lack of variance in the dependent variable. 
As seen in Table 2, correlations between discount rates were similar to (though somewhat 
lower than) those in Study 1. Discounting of monetary gains was correlated with health gains and 
air gains. Likewise, discounting of monetary losses was correlated with discounting of health 
losses, but only non-significantly correlated with discounting of air losses. Discounting of health 
gains was correlated with discounting of air gains, but health losses were not significantly 
correlated with air losses. Within domain correlations were weak.  
Table 2 
Pearson correlations of discount parameters for gains and losses in money, air quality, and 
health, in Study 2. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01 
 $- $+ air- air+ health- 
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air+ .03 .26** .29**   
health- .39** -.02 .08 -.04  
health+ -.06 .35** .22* .35** .09 
 
Just as 65% of participants preferred improved air quality for 3 weeks over receiving 
$250, so too 63% preferred paying $250 over 3 weeks of worse air quality. 88% of participants 
preferred 12 weeks of improved health to $250, while 92% preferred paying $250 to 12 weeks of 
worse health. Thus, different from Study 1, the non-monetary outcomes of the environmental 
scenarios used in this study were valued more highly than the monetary outcomes of the 
financial scenarios.  
Discussion 
 A sample of respondents living in areas with poor air quality expressed their 
intertemporal preferences for hypothetical monetary, air quality and health scenarios which were 
designed to control for as many factors as possible. Replicating the results of Study 1, mean 
discount rates did not differ significantly between air quality and monetary outcomes.
2
 At the 
same time, we extended previous results by showing that at one-year delays health gains were 
discounted more than gains in money or air quality while health losses were discounted less than 
losses in money or air quality. This suggests that participants were indeed sensitive to the 
domain, giving us more confidence in the null results observed in both studies. Further 
supporting the idea that similar processes drive discounting of money and air quality (but not 
health) was the fact that the CRT predicted discounting of monetary and air quality gains but not 
discounting of health gains or losses in any domain. For example, someone who is impatient in 





from average in his intertemporal preferences for poor health. This shows that cognitive 
impatience plays a role in discounting of (relatively abstract) gains, but not in time preference for 
losses or (affectively charged) health outcomes, highlighting the qualitatively different processes 
driving discount rates for gains and losses. As in Study 1, gains were discounted much more than 
losses in all domains, with a substantial proportion of participants exhibiting zero or negative 
discounting for losses in all domains.  
 Also as in Study 1, correlations of discount rates between-domain and within-valence 
were stronger than correlations within-valence and between-domain. In other words, knowing 
how much someone discounted monetary gains provided some predictions about how much they 
discounted air quality gains and health gains, but said little about how much they discounted 
monetary losses. This further supports the idea that while discounting of gains may be driven by 
a desire for immediate gratification, a different process determines time preference for losses.  
Study 3 
 Studies 1 and 2 compared discounting of environmental scenarios to discounting of 
typical financial scenarios, in an effort to see whether insights and findings from existing 
research may be usefully applied to the environmental domain. However, in doing so, two 
common differences between environmental and financial scenarios went unaddressed. First, 
while the money was to be received or paid as a lump sum, the environmental outcomes were to 
be experienced as a stream of benefits (or losses) spread out over time -- a difference which is 
known to affect intertemporal preferences (Hsee et al., 1991; Loewenstein & Sicherman, 1991; 
Guyse et al., 2002). Second, while typical research on monetary outcomes has examined short 





many years. Our third study explored these issues, while also better controlling for the subjective 
value of the outcomes.     
Pretest 
 While some researchers have controlled for magnitude effects by dynamically matching 
monetary and non-monetary outcomes for each participant prior to assessing discount rates 
(Chapman, 1996b), we worried that this would bias participants by mentioning both domains 
before they made their first choice (thereby confounding order effects), and by suggesting that 
the environmental outcomes were fungible.  
 Therefore, we conducted an extensive contingent valuation pretest with 180 participants 
in which we presented the air quality scenario (used in Study 1) and a series of dichotomous 
choice items which required participants to choose between the immediate gain (or loss) in air 
quality and getting (or paying) a given amount of money. This titration assessed roughly how 
much participants thought the gain or loss in air quality was worth to them. We also asked 
participants whether they believed air quality should be tradable with money. The results 
revealed that participants who believed environmental goods shouldn't be fungible valued 
changes in air quality roughly 3 to 4 times more than those who believed that there was nothing 
wrong with trading air quality with money. This pretest also indicated that the gain in air quality 
described in Study 1 was roughly equivalent in value to receiving $8.25 per day (median 
indifference point), while the worsening in air quality was roughly equivalent to paying $10 per 
day. 
Method 
 Participants. 185 participants were recruited were recruited in the same manner as Study 





completed the study in less than 10 minutes (mean completion time was 32.5 minutes), and 32 
participants who failed our careful-response criteria, leaving 146 participants for analysis. 
 Procedure. All participants responded to 2 monetary scenarios (gain and loss) and 2 air 
quality scenarios (gain and loss). Half the participants saw the environmental scenarios first, 
while the other half saw the reverse order. Gains were always presented before losses. The air 
quality scenarios were very similar to those used in Study 1, describing a 28 day improvement or 
worsening in air quality. The monetary gain scenario asked participants to imagine winning a 
lottery which would pay $9 a day for 28 days, while the loss scenario described a situation in 
which their house or apartment was in violation of a city ordinance and they would have to pay 
$9 a day for 28 days. As a between subjects manipulation, half the participants made choices 
between immediate and 1-year delayed outcomes, while the other half considered immediate and 
10-year delays.  
 Indifference points were assessed in the same manner as Studies 1 and 2, using a 
combination of titration and free response. However, the titration items used a log scale, to allow 
for higher indifference points at 10-year delays. One indifference point (for monetary gain at a 
10-year delay) was 8.7 standard deviations above the mean and so was omitted from subsequent 
analyses as an outlier. 
 After responding to each scenario, participants were asked to give a brief summary of 
their thoughts as they made their choices.  
Results  
 As summarized in Figure 3, participants discounted gains significantly more than losses, 
across domains and delays. A 2 (domain, within) x 2 (valence, within) x 2 (delay, between) x 2 





F(1,141) = 41.1, p < .001, p
2
 = .23, indicating that gains were discounted much more than 
losses, replicating previous studies. A significant order by domain interaction, F(1,141) = 5.6, p 
< .05, p
2
 = .04, and a marginally significant order by domain by valence interaction, F(1,141) = 
3.3, p < .1, p
2
 = .02, indicated that participants tended to discount the first scenario they saw 
significantly more, regardless of whether it was a financial gain or environmental gain. In other 
words, participants showed more impatience on the first questions they considered. Although 
none of the other main effects or interactions had significant effects, all p > .1, a trend for a 3-
way interaction between domain, valence, and delay suggested that air quality gains were 
discounted marginally more than monetary gains (ie, more impatience for improved air quality 
than money) at 1-year delay but marginally less at 10-year delays, F(1,141) = 2.3, p = .13, p
2
 = 
.02. While there was not a main effect of delay on mean discount rates, this does not mean that 
participants discounted outcomes the same for the two delay conditions. Rather, this indicates 
that participants were sensitive to delay and that the hyperbolic discounting model captured their 
pattern of discounting well, just as in previous research on discounting of environmental 
outcomes (Viscusi et al., 2008). Thus, participants in our study were indifferent on average 
between 28 days of worse air quality starting immediately, 34 days starting in 1 year, or 58 days 
starting in 10 years.   
Figure 3 
Mean discount parameters for streams of monetary and air quality gains and losses in Study 3. Error 







 Participants valued the environmental scenarios roughly equally to the financial 
scenarios. Given a choice, 51% of participants indicated they would prefer 28 days of improved 
air quality to 28 days of getting $9 per day, and 53% said they would prefer 28 days of worse air 
quality to 28 days of paying $9 per day. 
 As shown in Table 3, discounting of streams of monetary gains correlated with 
discounting of gains in air quality, and discounting of streams of monetary losses was correlated 
with discounting of worse air quality, correlations between gains and losses were generally 
weak.  
Table 3 
Pearson correlations of discount parameters for gains and losses in streams of money and air 
quality, in Study 3. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01  




















$+ .08   
Air- .42** .09  
Air+ -.03 .21* .17* 
 In their lists of thoughts about the scenarios, 20% of participants explicitly mentioned 
interest or returns on investment in response to the financial scenarios, while none of them 
mentioned this idea for the environmental scenarios. Other common thoughts concerned 
uncertainty ("It seems to me that immediate improvement is in order since the program might not 
go off the ground 10 years from now."), a positive time preference ("I want to experience 
immediately what the improved quality air is like"), or a belief in increased future resources 
("Could use the money now and may not need it so bad in one year"). 
Discussion 
 Replicating Studies 1 and 2, valence had a huge effect on discounting rates, while domain 
had relatively little effect, regardless of delay and regardless of the fact participants considered 
streams of money rather than lump sums. As before, correlations were stronger within sign (and 
cross domain) then within domain (and cross sign).  
General Discussion 
The research in this paper on the discounting of environmental outcomes was motivated 
by a combination of theoretical, policy-oriented, and practical considerations. Whether a 
government is deciding whether the use of different discount rates for environmental and 
financial projects expresses the will of its people, or a local power company wants to encourage 
its customers to weatherize their homes (thus incurring short-term costs but long-term energy 
savings), it is vital to know whether financial and environmental outcomes are discounted at 





outcomes also affect discounting of environmental outcomes. Understanding of the discounting 
of environmental outcomes is especially important because issues such as global warming 
involve very long time horizons.  
 In three studies that compared discount rates for different domains while controlling as many 
factors as possible, similar discount rates were observed for financial and environmental outcomes. This 
is good news for traditional economic models of discounting which employ a single discount rate across 
domains. While it is possible that small domain differences would emerge with greater statistical power or 
for very long time periods, our results suggest that valence has a much stronger influence on discount 
rates than domain. Although domain differences were observed between mean discount rates for health as 
compared to monetary or environmental outcomes, the effect of valence was substantially greater. It is 
possible, then, that previous studies positing lower discount rates for environmental outcomes have 
misinterpreted their results, because they confounded domain with valence and delay. Indeed, some 
studies of discounting of environmental outcomes even explicitly "assume that the discount rate is the 
same for costs and for improvements" (Viscusi et al., 2008, pg 202), which is clearly not tenable given the 
results of our studies. 
 Why are discount rates so similar for financial and environmental outcomes? Economists 
typically contend that it is rational to discount all future outcomes at the market discount rate, because the 
utility from any future outcome (such as air quality) can potentially be exchanged for utility from another 
source, thus all outcomes are fungible, and the choices of our participants ostensibly supported this view. 
However, in their descriptions of what they were thinking about (Study 3), no participants mentioned 
market interest rates or substitutability in response to the environmental scenarios, yet the discount rates 
were the same (on average) as for the financial scenarios. Furthermore, even when considering financial 
scenarios, only a fifth of participants mentioned investment. It is therefore likely that other processes 






 What was different about health outcomes? At first glance, one sees more similarities between 
health and the environment (difficult to quantify, environmental changes often impact health, etc) than 
between the environment and money. However, health outcomes, and the health scenarios we used in 
particular, may elicit more visceral reactions from participants. The vivid descriptions of good and bad 
health in the scenarios originally developed by Chapman (1996b) and the topic of health in particular, 
may stimulate more of an affective response in participants, enhancing the beta system, leading to greater 
discounting of gains and lower discounting of losses (recall that by all definitions of discounting, a 
present bias translates into lower discounting of losses).  
 Furthermore, correlations within valence (across domain) were stronger than those within domain 
(across valence). This finding seems slightly at odds with previous studies of health outcomes, which 
reported stronger correlations within domain than between domain (Chapman & Elstein, 1995; Chapman, 
1996b; Chapman et al., 1999). However, these studies mostly only examined gains. Two studies that 
compared discount rates for monetary and health gains and losses found insignificant correlations 
between them (r = .1 to .2). Furthermore, the reported high within-domain correlations (r = .7) came from 
responses to the same basic scenario with variations only in magnitude and delay (rather than correlating 
responses to two different scenarios within the same domain). Correlations between discount rates for 
different health gain scenarios were more modest, roughly r = .4 (Chapman et al., 1999).  
 Two identical situations should be discounted identically (with some noise), and as they become 
more dissimilar, you expect lower correlations. Therefore, based our research and previous studies, these 
correlations tell us that valence is a more salient contextual feature than domain. In other words, to predict 
how much someone discounted health gains, it is more useful to know how much they discounted 
monetary gains or environmental gains than to know how much they discounted health losses. Therefore, 
it might be more appropriate to describe the observed pattern of correlations in the literature as context 
dependence rather than domain dependence. In other words, discount rates are constructed based on the 





correlations between situations will be higher to the extent that these factors are similar. The good news 
from the present research is that discount rates assessed in the lab for one domain should be applicable to 
other domains and contexts, even predicting real world behaviors, as been recently found (Chabris, 
Laibson, Morris, Schuldt & Taubinsky, 2008). 
 Participants’ responses to our scenarios were undoubtedly influenced by the measurement 
methods we used. The values used in the titration scales suggested a reasonable range of indifference 
points to participants and suggested the possibility of negative discounting, thus influencing subsequent 
responses to the free response questions. Also, participants' discount rates were influenced by the order of 
presentation of gain and loss scenarios, in all three studies. Furthermore, it's likely that a different 
question format, such as presenting sequences or asking whether the future environment is less important 
that today's environment, would yield a different pattern of preferences, as has been seen with questions 
concerning human life (Frederick, 2003). We emphasize, therefore, that our objective was not to obtain 
point estimates of participants' "true" discount rates, but rather to determine which factors affect 
discounting, and their relative strengths. Future research might examine the effects of measurement 
method on discount rates, for example comparing contingent valuation measures (willingness to pay for 
environmental outcomes now or in the future) with the within-domain measures used in the present 
research.  
 One shortcoming of the present research was its reliance on self-report responses to hypothetical 
scenarios. It is possible that different results would be observed if individuals were to make consequential 
intertemporal choices about real monetary and environmental outcomes. However, previous research 
comparing temporal discounting of real and hypothetical monetary rewards found no differences when 
controlling for magnitude (Kirby, 1997; Johnson & Bickel, 2002).  
 Another shortcoming of the present research was the extent to which the environmental scenarios 





here probably do not reflect discounting of environmental outcomes in the real world because the 
scenarios employed here differ from real environmental situations in numerous ways. Future research 
should attempt to construct monetary scenarios to match more typical environmental scenarios on 
dimensions such as their time frame, ethical considerations, or the number of people affected. Doing so 
will require some ingenuity, but we should continue to test the limits and assumptions of our models 
against diverse real world phenomena rather than resting content to study only what is experimentally 
simple.  
 Some good news for environmental policy (whether trying to represent the general will or shape 
individual behavior) is that the great body of research on discounting of financial outcomes should be 
readily applicable to discounting of environmental outcomes, as long as care is taken to account for 
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 This nature and magnitude of exclusions is typical in on-line research, which has the 
advantage of a broader range of participants on socio-economic variables than university lab 
samples, but the disadvantage of lack of supervision of the way in which responses are provided. 
Excluding the careless respondents makes the data cleaner, but does not alter the major trends or 
our conclusions.  
 
2
 Although not predicted, discount rates for monetary gains were higher in Study 2 than 
in Study 1. This is somewhat surprising, because the same basic scenario was used in both 
studies (winning $250 immediately or another amount one year in the future). However, the 
order, format, and wording of the response options were different, and the participants were 
recruited from a different population. For example, in Study 1 the titration items were ordered 
from low to high, while in Study 2 they were ordered from high to low, thus the difference in 
discount rates between studies may have been due to anchoring on the response options. 
Furthermore, the median income of the participants in Study 2 was higher than the median 
income in Study 1, thus the difference in discount rates for $250 may be explained by the fact 
that (subjectively) smaller magnitude outcomes are discounted relatively more (Thaler, 1981). 
These possibilities highlight the importance of comparing discount rates for different domains 
within the same study, where factors like income are controlled for, rather than measuring 
discount rates for monetary scenarios in one study and environmental scenarios in another and 








Paper 3: Good or bad, we want it now: Present bias for gains and losses explains magnitude 
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Two studies investigated the joint effects of outcome sign (gains vs. losses) and outcome 
magnitude (small vs. large) on delay discount rates. Whereas rational-economic theory predicts 
that neither sign nor magnitude of outcomes should affect discounting, different psychological 
mechanisms predict different patterns of main effects and interactions. Study 1 replicates the 
well-established magnitude effect for gains, showing that large ($1,000) gains are discounted less 
than small ($10) gains, but also suggests that losses may show the opposite pattern, with small 
losses discounted less than large losses. Study 2 firmly establishes this pattern of results and 
provides process data implicating present bias in both the gain and loss decisions. Present bias is 
well established for gains and has traditionally described a prepotent preference for immediate 
rewards in order to satisfy the desire for obtainable gains (i.e., desire to have gains now). Our 
results establish present bias also for losses, where it describes a prepotent preference for 
immediate losses in order to preclude the need to attend to future losses (i.e., desire to have 
losses over with now). Present bias predicts increased discounting of future gains, but decreased 
(or even negative) discounting of future losses. Since present-bias feelings do not seem to scale 
with the magnitude of possible gains and losses, they play a larger role, relative to other 
motivations for discounting, for small magnitude intertemporal decisions than for than for large 
magnitude intertemporal decisions. This suggests that policy efforts to encourage future oriented 





Good or bad, we want it now: Present bias for gains and losses explains magnitude asymmetries 
in intertemporal choice  
 Whether racking up credit card debt, eating unhealthy foods, or acting in environmentally 
destructive ways, people often discount future consequences, wanting to have gains immediately 
and to postpone losses until later. In general, the farther into the future that an outcome is 
delayed, the more it is discounted. There are a number of factors hypothesized to contribute to 
the discounting of future gains (for overviews, see Frederick, Loewenstein, & O'Donoghue, 
2002; Hardisty, Orlove, Small, Krantz, & Milch, working paper). A reason often noted by 
economists is opportunity cost: one could take the immediate $100, invest it, and have more than 
$101 in a year's time (Franklin, 1748; Samuelson, 1937). A second reason to discount the future 
is uncertainty (Prelec & Loewenstein, 1991; B. J. Weber & Chapman, 2005). For example, if 
offered a choice between getting $100 now or $101 in a year, one may value the $100 more 
because it is a sure thing, whereas the future is inherently uncertain. A third reason is resource 
slack (Zauberman & Lynch, 2005): most people believe that, although money is tight right now, 
they will have more resources in the future, so it is more useful to have the money immediately 
rather than later. A fourth reason to discount the future is present bias (Laibson, 1997; 
O'Donoghue & Rabin, 1999): people are often impatient to have gains immediately, for no 
rational reason.  
 One well-established empirical observation about discounting is the so-called "magnitude 
effect", that people discount small gains at a higher rate than large gains (Baker, Johnson, & 
Bickel, 2003; Benhabib, Bisin, & Schotter, 2010; Chapman, 1996; Chapman & Elstein, 1995; 
Estle, Green, Myerson, & Holt, 2006; Giordano et al., 2002; Green, Myerson, & McFadden, 





1993; Thaler, 1981). For example, someone might choose $10 today versus $11 in a month, yet 
prefer to wait for $11,000 in a month rather than take an immediate $10,000, even though in both 
cases the later amount is 110% of the sooner amount. Two explanations for this magnitude effect 
are mental accounting and fixed-cost present bias.  
 According to the mental accounting theory (Loewenstein & Thaler, 1989), people may 
discount small gains more steeply because small and large gains activate different mental 
accounts for which different discount rates may exist. When considering a small gain, people 
think of it as spending money, whereas when they consider a large gain, they think of it as a 
potential investment. Thus, small amounts are associated with immediate consumption accounts 
and their typically high discount rates, whereas large amounts are associated with long-term 
savings accounts and their typically lower discount rates.  
 According to the theory of fixed-cost present bias (Benhabib, et al., 2010), people's desire 
to have good things right away (i.e., their present bias) appears to be worth about $4 to them, 
regardless of the size of the outcome under consideration or the length of the delay. As a 
consequence, people's impatience weighs much more heavily (in relative terms) when outcomes 
are small than with outcomes are large; in the context of $10 now versus $11 in a month, $4 
worth of impatience is a lot, but in the context of $10,000 now versus $11,000 in a month, $4 
worth of impatience is not very important.  
 Unfortunately, although both these theories are plausible explanations for why people 
might show lower discount rates for larger gains, neither can easily explain people's time 
preferences for small and large losses. The vast majority of studies of intertemporal choice have 





magnitude effect (Baker, et al., 2003; Estle, et al., 2006). Participants in one study showed 
similar discount rates for $100 losses as for $100,000 losses (Estle, et al., 2006), and participants 
in another study showed almost no difference in discount rates between losses of $10, $100, and 
$1,000. These findings present a complication for the mental accounting theory. If small and 
large gains are considered in different accounts associated with different discount rates, why 
would not losses of different sizes go into different accounts with different discount rates as 
well? The theory of fixed-cost present bias also cannot explain this, as it predicts an equal 
magnitude effect for both gains and losses. Fixed-cost present bias theory predicts that people 
put a premium (of roughly $4) on having gains now, and a premium (again of roughly $4) on 
postponing losses. For example, when considering paying $10 immediately or $12 in one month, 
participants would be predicted to choose the future $12, because it is worth $4 to the participant 
to postpone bad things and only the payment of $2 additional dollars is incurred by waiting. In 
contrast, when choosing between $1,000 or $1,200 in one month, the same participant would be 
expected to choose the immediate $1,000, because the additional $200 lost from waiting is much 
greater than the $4 premium the participants puts on immediate welfare. In this way, Benhabib et 
al.'s theory predicts an equal magnitude effect for gains and losses. In both cases, it predicts 
lower discounting for larger amounts.   
 We propose an extension of present bias, in which people have a psychological desire to 
resolve both gains and losses immediately. In the case of gains, people want the gain 
immediately to satisfy their desire for positive outcomes. In the case of losses, people want to get 
the loss over with immediately to close their books on the loss and avoid having to allocate 
attention and emotional capacity (e.g., dread) to looming future losses. In both cases, we assume 





et al., 2010, in the domain of gains). To explain further: as we consider when to receive or pay an 
amount, regardless of size, we have a desire to resolve the event immediately if possible. On a 
psychological level, we would like to have the gain now, and we would like to get the loss over 
with now.  If the gain or loss is a small amount, such as $10, our desire to satisfy impatience or 
to avoid dread is a relatively important factor. If the gain or loss is a large amount, such as 
$10,000, we still have the desire to resolve the event as soon as possible, but our desire to satisfy 
impatience or to avoid dread is a relatively unimportant factor. Because $10,000 is a lot of 
money, other factors, such as uncertainty and resource slack, become more important 
considerations. See Table 1 for a summary of this idea. Thus, for gains we make identical 








Summary of major factors hypothesized to determine intertemporal preferences for gains and 
losses of different sizes.  
Motivational 
Factor 






Uncertainty Delayed gains and 
losses may never be 
realized 
Gains now and 
losses later 
Increase for gains 
and losses 
Yes 
Opportunity cost and 
investment 
Resources can be 
invested and earn 
interest or otherwise 
grow over time 
Gains now and 
losses later 
Increase for gains 
and losses 
Yes 
Resource slack Expecting to have 
more resources in 
the future means that 
immediate resources 
are more dear than 
future resources 
Gains now and 
losses later 
Increase for gains 
and losses 
Yes 
Present bias Psychological desire 
to resolve events 
immediately 
Both gains and 
losses now 
Increase for gains, 
decrease for losses 
No 
Other factors, such 
as social norms and 
ideals 
Variable, but often 
individuals are 
taught they ought to 
delay gratification 
Variable, but often 
postponing gains 
and attending to 
losses immediately 
Variable, but often a 
common goal is 
lower discount rates 
Variable 
 
Importantly, our theory predicts that negative discounting of losses should occur when 
amounts are small enough. Negative discounting implies that outcome values intensify (i.e., 
positives become more positive and negatives become more negative) the further they lie in the 
future; in the case of losses, negative discounting means a preference to have losses sooner rather 
than later. For example, some people might rather pay $10 immediately rather than $9 in a year, 
to satisfy their desire to get the loss over with. In this case, we should observe a full reversal of 





observed in existing studies on sign and magnitude (Baker, et al., 2003; Estle, et al., 2006), these 
studies did not in fact allow participants to express this preference. These studies always paired a 
smaller, sooner amount with a larger, later amount, so zero or negative discount rates were not 
possible.  
 In Study 1, therefore, we tested our prediction by presenting participants with choices 
between immediate and future gains and losses that were either small (around $10) or large 
(around $1,000). Importantly, we included choice options which allowed for negative discount 
rates, such as a choice between paying $10 immediately and $9 in the future. We predicted that 
whereas small gains would be discounted more than large gains, showing the usual magnitude 
effect, small losses would be discounted less than large losses, showing a reverse magnitude 
effect. We also expected losses to be discounted less than gains overall for the reasons mentioned 
above, as in previous studies on discount rates for gains and losses (Appelt, Hardisty, & Weber, 
working paper; Hardisty & Weber, 2009; Thaler, 1981).  
Study 1 
Method 
A national sample of 58 participants (mean age=37, SD=13, 68% female) was recruited 
and run online through the virtual lab of the Center for Decision Sciences for a study on decision 
making. Participants were paid $7 for completing this and another study. In a 2x2 mixed design, 
each participant responded to two intertemporal choice scenarios, one gain and one loss, in 
counterbalanced order. Between subjects, participants were randomly assigned to scenarios with 






In each scenario, participants made a series of eight hypothetical choices between a fixed 
immediate amount and a varying delayed amount available in six months (i.e., a choice titration 
was used). For example, in the small gain condition, participants were asked to choose between 
receiving $10 today and receiving $9 in six months, receiving $10 today and receiving $10 in six 
months, receiving $10 today and receiving $11 in six months, etc. The immediate amount was 
fixed at $10 in the small magnitude condition and $1,000 in the large magnitude condition. The 
delayed amounts varied from $9 to $500 and $900 to $50,000, respectively.  For the complete 
list of choice options, see Appendix A. Hypothetical outcomes were used out of necessity, 
because it was not possible to execute real $50,000 losses with participants. Fortunately, several 
studies have shown that hypothetical intertemporal choice outcomes are consistent with and 
predict real outcomes (Bickel et al., 2010; Bickel, Pitcock, Yi, & Angtuaco, 2009; Chabris, 
Laibson, Morris, Schuldt, & Taubinsky, 2008; Shamosh et al., 2008).  
Results 
 Data from 8 participants were excluded for careless responding, as determined by any of 
the following three criteria: switching back and forth on the intertemporal choice scale more than 
once (i.e., non-monotonic responding), perversely switching on the intertemporal choice scale 
(for example, choosing to receive $12 in six months rather than $10 today, and subsequently 
choosing $10 today rather than $14 in six months), or completing the study more than two 
standard deviations faster than the average natural log of completion time. This left data from 50 
participants for further analysis (28 in the small magnitude condition, and 22 in the large 





 Participants' responses were converted into intertemporal indifference pairs by taking the 
average of the values around the switch point. For example, if a participant chose to receive $10 
today over $12 in six months, and chose $15 in six months over $10 today, then the participant 
was judged to be indifferent between receiving $10 today and $13.50 in six months. To easily 
compare discounting across magnitudes, indifference between choice options was converted into 
a discount rate, using the continuously compounded exponential formula V=Ae
-kD
 (Samuelson, 
1937), where V is the immediately available amount (e.g., $10), A is the future amount (e.g.,, 
$13.50), e is the constant (2.718), D is the delay in years (e.g., 6 months = 0.5), and k is a fitted 
parameter, the discount rate.
3
  
 As seen in Figure 1, discount rates varied considerably depending on whether participants 
were considering small or large gains or losses. Although small gains (mean discount rate=0.94, 
SD=1.03) were discounted significantly more than large gains (M=0.38, SD=.33), there was a 
non-significant trend for small losses (M=-.06, SD=.55) to be discounted less than large losses 
(M=.09, SD=.16). A 2x2 ANOVA with sign and magnitude predicting discount rates confirmed a 
main effect of sign as predicted, F(1,48)=37.0, p<.001, η2=.44; a sign by magnitude interaction 
as predicted, F(1,48)=11.5, p=.001, η2=.19; but no main effect of magnitude, F(1,48)=1.9, p>.1, 
η2=.04. Although a pairwise comparison of the small loss condition to the large loss condition 
did not find a significant difference, t(48)=1.3, p>.1, d=.44, sample sizes were somewhat small 
and the effect size was moderate, so results are inconclusive rather than indicating no difference 
                                                          
3
 We chose this equation (rather than the hyperbolic model or the area-under-the-curve method) 
because it is easily interpretable. For example, a k of .6 is the equivalent of a continuous discount 
rate of 60%, in the standard economic sense. Higher numbers indicate greater discounting, a k of 
zero means no discounting, and negative k values indicate negative discounting. As choices in 
this study all involved the same two time points (immediate outcomes vs. outcomes in six 
months), exponential and hyperbolic modeling would fit the data equally well, so there was no 
advantage to using the hyperbolic model, which (which is known to generally model data better 





at all. The paired comparison of large and small gains was significant, t(48)=2.5, p<.05, d=.82, 
demonstrating the classic magnitude effect. 
Figure 1 
Mean discount rates k for small and large gains and losses, in Study 1. Error bars indicate +/- 
one standard error.  
 
 In concrete terms, participants considering small gains were indifferent on average 
between receiving $10 today and $16 in six months, whereas participants considering large gains 
were indifferent between receiving $1,000 today and $1,210 in six months. In contrast, 
participants considering small losses were indifferent between paying $10 today and $9.70 in six 
months, whereas those considering large losses were indifferent between paying $1,000 today 





Notably, zero discounting and negative discounting were quite common in the small loss 
condition, but were fairly rare in the other conditions. Specifically, when faced with a choice 
between paying $10 immediately or $10 in six months, 50% of participants chose to pay 
immediately. In contrast, when considering large losses, only 22% expressed this preference, 
z=1.73, p<.10. When considering whether to receive $10 today or $10 in six months, only 11% 
chose the future option, and when considering $1,000 versus $1,000 in six months, 5% showed 
this preference.  
Discussion 
 As predicted, there was an interaction between sign and magnitude in predicting discount 
rates; whereas small gains were discounted more than large gains, choices for losses eliminated 
or reversed this trend. As the evidence for the reversal with losses was weak, we decided to run a 
follow-up study with a larger sample size to see if this reversal would replicate.  
 Furthermore, we wanted to collect process data to test whether people's desire to resolve 
events immediately drives the reversal. To do this, we asked participants to list their thoughts 
about the intertemporal choice scenario, before they made any choices, using an established 
"type aloud" protocol (E. U. Weber et al., 2007). Subsequently, after making their choices, we 
presented participants' own thoughts back to them, and asked them to code the content of each 
thought. As summarized in Table 1 (above), we predicted that concerns about uncertainty and 
resource slack would grow more important for larger amounts, and therefore that mentions of 
wanting to have the gain or loss immediately for other, psychological reasons (i.e., present bias) 
would be proportionally less common with larger magnitudes. In other words, a fixed-cost 





influential. We predicted that the relative frequency of these present-biased thoughts would 
mediate the effect of magnitude on discount rates, in opposite directions for gains and losses. In 
other words, we predicted that present bias would make participants desire to resolve gains 
immediately and losses immediately, which results in greater discount rates for gains and lower 
discount rates for losses. With increased magnitude, the influence of present bias is reduced, 
which changes discount rates accordingly (see Figure 6 for a summary).   
Study 2 
Method 
A sample of 224 US residents (mean age=37, SD=12, 76% female) was recruited and run 
online in the same manner as Study 1. Participants were compensated $8 for completing this 
study and two unrelated studies. In a 2x2 between-subjects design, participants were randomly 
assigned to one of four conditions: small gain, large gain, small loss, or large loss. We ran this as 
a between-subjects design for two reasons. One was to maximize the asymmetries in discounting 
observed in Study 1 between small and large gains and losses, to see if the reversal of the 
magnitude effect could be replicated. The second reason was because the quality and quantity of 
thought listings often go down sharply after the first scenario participants complete.   
 Participants first received training with the computerized "type aloud" interface, in which 
participants entered one thought at a time.  Participants in the small [large] gain conditions then 
read the following passage:  
Imagine there was a legitimate error on your back taxes in your 
favor, and you will immediately receive $10 [$10,000] from the 
government. However, they are also giving you the option of 
receiving a different amount one year from now, instead. How 





amount you would receive today is $10 [$10,000]. The amount you 
would receive in the future ranges from $9 [$9,000] to $35 
[$35,000]. We will ask you several questions about whether you 
would prefer to get $10 [$10,000] today or another amount one 
year from today. 
Participants in the small [large] loss conditions read: 
Imagine there was a legitimate error on your back taxes against 
you, and you must pay the government $10 [$10,000] 
immediately. However, they are also giving you the option of 
paying a different amount one year from now, instead. How much 
would the future amount need to be for you to choose it? The 
amount you would pay today is $10 [$10,000]. The amount you 
would pay in the future ranges from $9 [$9,000] to $35 [$35,000]. 
We will ask you several questions about whether you would prefer 
to pay $10 [$10,000] today or another amount one year from 
today. 
All participants then listed their thoughts about the scenario, following the instruction: 
Before you indicate your preference for these choices, please tell us 
everything you are thinking of as you consider this decision between 
receiving [paying] $10 [$10,000] today or receiving [paying] a larger 
amount in one year. 
We would like you to list any thoughts, both positive and negative, that 
you might have about this decision. We will ask you to enter your 
thoughts one at a time.  
Subsequently, participants made a series of ten choices between a fixed immediate 
amount and a varying later amount, similar to Study 1. The immediate amount was always $10 
[$10,000], and the future amount ranged from $9 [$9,000] to $35 [$35,000]. The future amount 
was always one year in the future. For the complete list of choices, please see Appendix B.  
 After that, participants were presented with the thoughts they had listed earlier, one at a 
time, and asked to code each thought as to whether the primary topic of the thought was 
"Earning interest on investments" (i.e. opportunity cost), "Future uncertainty" (i.e. uncertainty), 





what you want (for example, 'I want it now to get it over with')" (i.e. present bias), "Other: what 
you ought to do (for example, 'I should wait')" (i.e., social norms) or "None of the above." These 
categories correspond to the factors presented in Table 1 (above). Participants also coded 
whether the thought favored choosing the immediate option or the future option. Finally, 
participants answered demographics.  
Results 
The data from 25 participants were excluded because of careless responding, using the 
same criteria as in Study 1 and leaving data from 199 participants for analysis. We converted 
choices to indifference points and discount rates, again using the same procedure as for Study 1.  
As summarized in Figure 2, participants' discount rates depended both on the sign and 
magnitude of the outcome, replicating the results of Study 1. Although participants discounted 
small gains (mean k =.51, SD=.45) more than large gains (M=.29, SD=.31), they discounted 
small losses (M=-.06, SD=.14) less than large losses (M=.07, SD=.17). This was confirmed with 
a 2x2 ANOVA using sign and magnitude to predict discount rates, which revealed a main effect 
of sign, F(1,195)=86.4, p<.001, η2=.31; and a sign by magnitude interaction, F(1,195)=17.5, 
p<.001, η2=.08; but did not find evidence for a main effect of magnitude, F(1,195)=1.1, p>.10, 
η2=.01. Pairwise comparisons within each sign between small and large outcomes confirmed the 
magnitude effect for gains, t(101)=2.9, p<.01, d=.58, and the reverse magnitude effect for losses, 
t(94)=4.2, p<.001, d=.87.  
In dollar terms, participants were on average indifferent between receiving $10 
immediately and $16.60 in one year (i.e., when considering small gains), but $10,000 





indifferent between losing $10 immediately and $9.42 in one year (i.e., when considering small 
losses), but $10,000 immediately and $10,740 in one year (i.e., when considering large losses).  
As in Study 1, zero and negative discount rates were extremely common when considering small 
losses, with 78% of participants expressing this preference. In contrast, only 23% of those 
considering large losses, 2% of those considering small gains, and 2% of those considering large 
gains showed zero or negative discount rates.  
Figure 2 
Mean discount rates k for small versus large gains and losses, in Study 2. Error bars show +/- 

























 Prior to making their choices, participants listed an average of 3.4 thoughts (SD=2). 
Participants considering large magnitude outcomes listed 0.6 more thoughts than participants 
considering the small outcome, t(197)=2.1, p<.05, d=.15.  This is consistent with the theory that 
most intertemporal motivations grow more pressing with larger magnitudes. The number of 
thoughts listed did not vary between gains and losses, nor was there an interaction. The number 
of thoughts coded as falling into the different types of thought categories described above 
differed depending on whether the intertemporal choice considered was between small or large 
gains or losses. We used the proportion of thoughts a decision maker classified as both "Other: 
what you want (for example, 'I want it now to get it over with')" and as favoring the immediate 
option as a measure of the relative prevalence of present-biased thoughts. An example of a 
present-biased thought provided by a participant was, "I like to manage situations that arise in 
my life as quickly as I can, regardless of the conditions/content."  
As seen in Figure 3, the relative frequency of present-biased thoughts was significantly 
lower for large magnitude outcomes. A 2x2 ANOVA with sign and magnitude predicting 
proportion of present bias thoughts found significant main effects of magnitude, F(1,195)=8.3, 
p<.01, η2=.04; and sign, F(1,195)=14.9, p<.001, η2=.07; but not an interaction, F(1,195)=.88, 
p>.10, η2=.01.  
Figure 3 
Mean proportion of present bias thoughts, depending on the sign and magnitude of the outcomes, 






In contrast, the relative frequency of other concerns such as future uncertainty and 
resource slack grew larger with larger magnitude outcomes, as seen in Figure 4 and Figure 5. A 
2x2 ANOVA with sign and magnitude predicting proportion of thoughts about future uncertainty 
found a main effect of magnitude, F(1,195)=7.8, p<.01, η2=.04, but no evidence for a main effect 
of sign or an interaction. Similarly, an ANOVA predicting thoughts about resource slack found a 
marginally significant effect of magnitude, F(1,195)=3.7, p<.10, η2=.02, but no evidence for a 
main effect of sign or an interaction. Refer back to our new figure to make the point that only 
















































Mean proportion of thoughts about uncertainty, depending on the sign and magnitude of the 
outcomes, in Study 2. Error bars show +/- one standard error.  
 
Figure 5 
Mean proportion of thoughts about resource slack, depending on the sign and magnitude of the 

















































 Finally, through mediation models, we tested whether the proportion of "want now" 
thoughts explain how sign and magnitude interact to predict discount rates, as summarized in 
Figure 6. We ran two separate mediation models, one for gains and one for losses. For both gain 
and loss choices, larger magnitude outcomes lead to a lower proportion of "want now" thoughts, 
and in both cases, the proportion of "want now" thoughts predicted discounting while controlling 
for magnitude (thus following the standard mediation model). However, as predicted and 
described above, the direction of the relationship between "want now" thoughts and discounting 
is opposite for gains and losses: more want now thoughts were associated with greater 
discounting of gains, but lower discounting of losses. Both mediation models were significant at 

















































Bolger (2002). However, effect sizes were generally small (standardized betas in the range of .2 






Mediation diagrams showing magnitude having an effect on discount rates through "want now" 
thoughts, separately for gains and losses, in Study 2. βs show standardized betas. Note, that the 









 As observed in Study 1 and replicated in Study 2, losses can show a reverse magnitude 
effect in intertemporal choice. In other words, whereas people are more patient for large gains 
than small gains, they have a greater tendency to postpone large losses than small losses. Our 
studies are the first to demonstrate this reversal, which is most likely due to the fact that most 
studies of intertemporal choice do not allow participants to express zero or negative discount 
rates, because they take the rational-economic model of discounting as their point of departure.  
 We explain this reversal with a reconceptualization and generalization of present bias. 
We contend that in addition to people's desire to resolve intertemporal gains immediately, they 
also often have a psychological desire to resolve losses immediately. This present bias translates 
into higher discount rates for gains, and lower discount rates for losses. Furthermore, we agree 
with Benhabib and colleagues (2010) that this present bias does not scale with magnitude, 
representing a sort of "fixed cost" which becomes relatively unimportant with large magnitude 
outcomes. In other words, people are impatient to have gains immediatly, and people want to get 
losses over with as soon as possible, but this psychological concern is relatively unimportant in 
the face of large magnitude outcomes. For example, someone may prefer to deal with a small 
problem right away, but put off large problems until later. Our process data in Study 2 support 
this theory, showing that present bias thoughts mediate the effect of magnitude on discounting, 
for both gains and losses.  
Our studies manipulated magnitude between subjects; it would be interesting in future 
studies to see if this reversal would hold in a within-subjects design. Furthermore, it would be 





strongest and at what point it is eliminated. It would also be interesting to run a study and 
analysis identical to Benhabib and colleagues (2010) but with losses instead of gains, to 
determine if the size of the present bias for losses (the desire to get them over with immediately) 
is also $4, or if it is a different amount. Our intuition is that it would be smaller, based on the 
data in this paper showing that while negative discounting of losses does occur, most people 
would not choose to lose $10 today rather than $6 in the future.  
Our findings may offer some guidance to policy-makers hoping to encourage responsible 
intertemporal decision making. Whereas patience for gains can be encouraged by focusing on a 
large magnitude future goal, the same strategy should not be applied to losses; people are 
motivated to take care of small losses immediately, but large losses may swamp this tendency 
and result in postponing the loss until later. This might be one reason why efforts to portray 
global warming as a huge future problem have been unsuccessful for motivating action. Breaking 
the problem down into smaller pieces might be more effective.  
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List of options presented to participants in Study 1.  
Receive $10 immediately Receive $9 in six months 
Receive $10 immediately Receive $10 in six months 
Receive $10 immediately Receive $11 in six months 
Receive $10 immediately Receive $15 in six months 
Receive $10 immediately Receive $20 in six months 
Receive $10 immediately Receive $30 in six months 
Receive $10 immediately Receive $50 in six months 
Receive $10 immediately Receive $100 in six months 
Receive $10 immediately Receive $500 in six months 
 
Pay $10 immediately Pay $9 in six months 
Pay $10 immediately Pay $10 in six months 
Pay $10 immediately Pay $11 in six months 
Pay $10 immediately Pay $15 in six months 
Pay $10 immediately Pay $20 in six months 
Pay $10 immediately Pay $30 in six months 
Pay $10 immediately Pay $50 in six months 
Pay $10 immediately Pay $100 in six months 






Receive $1,000 immediately Receive $900 in six months 
Receive $1,000 immediately Receive $1,000 in six months 
Receive $1,000 immediately Receive $1,100 in six months 
Receive $1,000 immediately Receive $1,500 in six months 
Receive $1,000 immediately Receive $2,000 in six months 
Receive $1,000 immediately Receive $3,000 in six months 
Receive $1,000 immediately Receive $5,000 in six months 
Receive $1,000 immediately Receive $10,000 in six months 
Receive $1,000 immediately Receive $50,000 in six months 
 
Pay $1,000 immediately Pay $900 in six months 
Pay $1,000 immediately Pay $1,000 in six months 
Pay $1,000 immediately Pay $1,100 in six months 
Pay $1,000 immediately Pay $1,500 in six months 
Pay $1,000 immediately Pay $2,000 in six months 
Pay $1,000 immediately Pay $3,000 in six months 
Pay $1,000 immediately Pay $5,000 in six months 
Pay $1,000 immediately Pay $10,000 in six months 








List of options presented to participants in Study 2.  
Receive $10 immediately Receive $9 in six months 
Receive $10 immediately Receive $10 in six months 
Receive $10 immediately Receive $10.50 in six months 
Receive $10 immediately Receive $11 in six months 
Receive $10 immediately Receive $12 in six months 
Receive $10 immediately Receive $14 in six months 
Receive $10 immediately Receive $17 in six months 
Receive $10 immediately Receive $20 in six months 
Receive $10 immediately Receive $25 in six months 
Receive $10 immediately Receive $35 in six months 
 
Pay $10 immediately Pay $9 in six months 
Pay $10 immediately Pay $10 in six months 
Pay $10 immediately Pay $10.50 in six months 
Pay $10 immediately Pay $11 in six months 
Pay $10 immediately Pay $12 in six months 
Pay $10 immediately Pay $14 in six months 
Pay $10 immediately Pay $17 in six months 
Pay $10 immediately Pay $20 in six months 





Pay $10 immediately Pay $35 in six months 
 
 
Receive $10,000 immediately Receive $9,000 in six months 
Receive $10,000 immediately Receive $10,000 in six months 
Receive $10,000 immediately Receive $10,500 in six months 
Receive $10,000 immediately Receive $11,000 in six months 
Receive $10,000 immediately Receive $12,000 in six months 
Receive $10,000 immediately Receive $14,000 in six months 
Receive $10,000 immediately Receive $17,000 in six months 
Receive $10,000 immediately Receive $20,000 in six months 
Receive $10,000 immediately Receive $25,000 in six months 
Receive $10,000 immediately Receive $35,000 in six months 
 
Pay $10,000 immediately Pay $9,000 in six months 
Pay $10,000 immediately Pay $10,000 in six months 
Pay $10,000 immediately Pay $10,500 in six months 
Pay $10,000 immediately Pay $11,000 in six months 
Pay $10,000 immediately Pay $12,000 in six months 
Pay $10,000 immediately Pay $14,000 in six months 





Pay $10,000 immediately Pay $20,000 in six months 
Pay $10,000 immediately Pay $25,000 in six months 
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When making decisions about future events, we consider not only the pain or pleasure the event 
will cause us when it occurs, but also the psychological pain or pleasure of anticipating the event.  
In Study 1, participants reported experiencing aversive anticipation (aka dread) roughly twice as 
often as pleasurable anticipation (aka savoring).  In particular, the anticipation of positive 
outcomes (gains) was sometimes pleasurable and sometimes painful (due to impatience), 
whereas the anticipation of negative outcomes (losses) was painful or neutral.  In study 2, 
anticipation value was found to predict time preference.  In study 3, the "dread looms larger" 
effect was found to persist even when controlling for loss aversion. In combination, these results 
may help explain the "sign effect", i.e., why losses are discounted less than gains.   
 
 





Dread looms larger than pleasurable anticipation 
Our desire to experience something now or postpone it until later reflects multiple, 
conceptually distinct forces.  Many of these apply equally to gains and losses.  For example, the 
uncertainty that a future event will actually happen (or that one will be alive to experience it) 
often provides as strong of a reason to postpone something negative as to accelerate something 
positive.  Similarly, the interest lost by delaying a $100 reward for a year is equivalent to the 
interest gained by delaying a $100 loss.  Despite these symmetries, laboratory studies of 
intertemporal choice typically find that the desire to have good things immediately is much 
stronger than the desire to postpone negative outcomes (Frederick, Loewenstein, & O'Donoghue, 
2002; Hardisty & Weber, 2009; Thaler, 1981).  The reasons for this “sign effect,” however, are 
not yet well understood.   
One hypothesis involves asymmetries in the utility (and disutility) of the anticipation of 
gains and losses: if dread looms larger than pleasurable anticipation, the desire to postpone losses 
will be weakened more than the desire to accelerate gains, thereby producing lower discounting 
for losses than gains.  For example, many would prefer to pay a $50 bill immediately to avoid 
having it “hang over their head” for a month, but, by contrast, few would delay the receiving $50 
immediately to extend the period of pleasurable anticipation – i.e., the pains of dread outweigh 
the pleasures of anticipation.   
Preliminary data lend support to this conjecture.  In one study, one hundred and three 
participants from Harvard’s Computer Lab for Experimental Research (which draws participants 
about equally from Harvard’s student population and residents of Boston) received $10 to 





you would be willing to pay for a kiss from your favorite movie star tonight? and (2) What is the 
most you would be willing to pay for a kiss from your favorite movie star three days from 
tonight? Participants who gave different answers to these two questions (presented side by side) 
were asked to give a reason why.   
To our surprise, just six participants indicated they would pay more for the delayed kiss, 
and just one mentioned pleasurable anticipation as the reason.  The results suggest that 
pleasurable anticipation was weak or rare, or, in any case, insufficient to motivate differences in 
willingness to pay for a kiss at different times.  By contrast, a study on dread we conducted at the 
University of Michigan with fifty-six undergraduates suggested that many people would make 
sacrifices to accelerate an aversive event.  Specifically, among participants who indicated they 
would prefer eating 9 mealworms today to eating 9 next week (about two-thirds of the sample), 
over half of said they would maintain this preference, even if they could eat one fewer next week 
(8 mealworms).  This study suggests a willingness to incur a more aversive experience sooner to 
minimize the dread.
4
 Similarly, a series of recent studies by Christine Harris (2010) conclude that 
anticipation of dread plays an important role in intertemporal choice for losses. She demonstrated 
a preference reversal from dread, whereby a sooner loss would be chosen if it was available 
immediately, but if both options were in the future, the later loss would be chosen.   
We note here that the language for discussing anticipatory emotions is somewhat 
impoverished.  Following Loewenstein (1987), we will use the term savoring to refer to the 
pleasurable anticipation of future positive events, though the term is awkward, since it is most 
commonly used to refer to pleasure arising from concurrent experiences (e.g.  savoring a bite of 
lobster) or reflecting on past experiences (e.g.  savoring the team’s lone Super Bowl title).  We 
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will use the term impatience to refer to the negative experience of waiting for something positive 
to occur.  We will use the term dread to refer to the negative experience of waiting for something 
negative to occur.  We know of no term that refers to pleasure from anticipating negative events.  
We suspect that this unnamed emotion is extremely rare, even for negative events respondents 
prefer to postpone for any number of other reasons (fear, pure time preference, uncertainty, etc.). 
Discussions of the relative power of savoring and dread are rare (though see Elster & 
Loewenstein, 1992) and, to our knowledge, the only published empirical comparison is a paper 
by Loewenstein (1987) which compared movie star kisses with electric shocks.  Therefore, we 
ran a series of three studies to more broadly explore the role of anticipation in intertemporal 
choice: Study 1 compared the relative prevalence of dread vs savoring, Study 2 explored whether 
anticipation utility predicts time preference, and Study 3 tested whether asymmetries in 
anticipation effects persisted when controlling for loss aversion.  
Participants in our exploratory first study were asked to generate as many examples as 
they could summon of events they would prefer to postpone or events they would prefer to 
accelerate.  Later, participants were asked to quantify how much pleasure [or displeasure] they 
would experience while waiting for each event they had listed.  We predicted that dread would 
be more pronounced than savoring.   
Study 1 
Methods 





 A convenience sample of 155 participants (mean age=39, SD=15) were recruited from 
decision making research laboratories at Columbia and an online pool.
5
 In a 2X2 between-
subjects design, respondents were randomly assigned to consider either positive or negative 
events, and to either give examples of events they would prefer to happen sooner, or events they 
would prefer to happen later.
6
 Participants were required to generate at least one event, but could 
list as many as they wished.  For each listed event, respondents were then asked "If this thing 
were one week away, how would you feel about anticipating it?" and responded on a 7-point 
bipolar scale ranging from -3 ("I would really dislike waiting for it") to 3 ("I would really like 
waiting for it").  We excluded thirty-five participants who failed an attention check (similar to 





 Not surprisingly, for the positive events participants would prefer to postpone, they 
generally predicted positive anticipation utility (mean rating = +.43, SD=1.6) and for the positive 
events they’d prefer to accelerate, they generally predicted negative anticipation utility (mean= -
1.1, SD=1.1), t(59)=4.3, p<.001.  For negative events, respondents expected to suffer more for 
the events they’d prefer to accelerate (mean=-1.4, SD=1.5) than those they preferred to postpone 
(mean=-1.0, SD=1.3), though this difference was not significant .  Both of these patterns are seen 
in Figure 1.  A 2x2 ANOVA showed significant effects for sign, F(1,113)=10.6, p=.001, time, 
F(1,113)=13.0, p<.001, and the interaction, F(1,113)=5.6, p=.02.   
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 The only statistically significant difference between the samples was a main effect of the lab members listing more 
examples.  
6
 For the complete text of the instructions, see Supplemental Materials A.  
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Mean anticipation utility assigned by participants to their self-generated events, in each of four 
conditions in Study 1: good things they would prefer to experience sooner, good things they 
would prefer to experience later, bad things they would prefer to experience sooner, and bad 
things they would prefer to experience later.  Error bars represent +/- one standard error.   
 
 We also compared the frequency with which participants classified events as having 
positive or negative anticipation value.  As seen in Table 1, the dread was reported much more 
often than savoring.  Overall, 69% of negative events were rated as producing dread, while only 
38% of positive events were rated as producing savoring, a significant difference in proportions, 
































Table 1  
Proportion of events classified by participants as provoking dread, pleasurable anticipation, or 
neither, depending on what type of events participants had generated (positive events vs negative 
events that they would prefer to happen immediately vs later).   
 











Negative Anticipation 74% 22% 75% 63% 58% 
Neutral Anticipation 15% 14% 13% 18% 15% 
Positive Anticipation 11% 64% 12% 19% 27% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Total N = 433 events 
 
Discussion  
 While negative events usually caused, positive events on balanced sometimes produced 
savoring but sometimes produced impatience.  It is likely that many participants considering 
future gains experienced a mixed emotional state, characterized by both impatience and 
pleasurable anticipation.  This suggests an explanation for the "sign effect" conjectured above: 





delaying losses almost always imposes a cost, whereas delaying gains is at least sometimes 
pleasurable.    
 In Study 2, we examine whether anticipation utility predicts time preference, across a 
variety of domains. We specified twenty events (10 positive and 10 negative) for each 
respondent to consider, presented in random order.  For each event, participants indicated when 
they’d want that event to occur (now, later, or don’t care), rated the event’s anticipation utility 
given a specified delay, and rated the subjective value of experiencing the event at the given 
delay (in other words, the future value of the event).  We predicted that dread would be more 
common than savoring, and that anticipation value would help predict their preferences for the 
event’s timing.   
 Furthermore, we investigated the robustness of the "dread looms larger" effect over time, 
by investigating delays of three days to five years. We hypothesized that although anticipation 
utility would be weaker at longer delays, as suggested by previous theory (Loewestein, 1987), 
the imbalance between anticipation of gains and losses would persist at all delays.  
Study 2 
Methods  
 Participants  
 271 US residents (mean age=42, SD=14) from a range of socioeconomic backgrounds 
were recruited and run online, and paid $7 for their participation. 





 Ten positive and ten negative events (listed in Table 2, below) were selected, drawn from 
Study 1 and the literature on anticipation and discounting.  Item categories listed most frequently 
by participants in Study 1 were distilled into events for Study 2.  We also included several classic 
examples from the literature, even though they were not mentioned by any participants, such as 
"a kiss from the movie star of your choice" or "twenty painful (but harmless) electric shocks." 
Thus, we included a range of events of practical as well as theoretic interest.   While these events 
certainly do not represent all gain and loss events that people may experience, they do offer a 
broader range than is typically investigated in intertemporal choice studies.   
 Procedure 
 Participants first read a brief introduction and explanation, stating:  
The following pages will ask questions about immediate and future 
gains and losses.  When you see the word 'immediate,' it means the 
very near future -- today or tomorrow.  Many of the following 
questions will ask how you would feel while waiting for things.  
In some cases, you may enjoy the process of waiting.  For 
example, if a special holiday is a couple weeks away, the waiting 
may be pleasant.  Other times, you may dislike the way you feel 
while waiting.  For example, if you are waiting for a red light to 
turn green, the waiting may be unpleasant. 
 
Participants then considered all twenty events in random order.  Within condition, delay was the 
same for all the events, and was manipulated between subjects to be either three days, one week, 
one month, one year, or five years.  For each event, participants answered three questions, (1) 
"Assuming this event would definitely happen to you and you knew it were coming, when would 





period] from now." (2) "If this event were to happen to you [delay period] from now, how 
positive or negative would the event be at that time?" Participants responded by clicking on a 
line (a continuous -100 to 100 measure), labeled with "extremely negative", "neutral", and 
"extremely positive".  (3) "If this event were [delay period] away, how psychologically 
pleasurable or unpleasurable would the anticipation be? In other words, how would you feel 
while waiting for it?" Participants responded by clicking on a line (also -100 to 100) labeled 
with "strongly dislike the feeling of waiting", "neutral", and "strongly like the feeling of 
waiting." Following these responses, participants completed the attention check (same as in 
Study 1), the cognitive reflection test (Frederick, 2005) and some demographic questions.   
 
Results 
 After excluding participants who failed the attention check, 169 participants remained.
8
 
Time preferences for each event were coded for use as a dependent variable: "immediately" was 
coded as 1, "don't care" was 0, and "[delay period] from now" was -1.   
Our results, shown in Table 2 and Figure 2, can be summarized thusly:  (1) Respondents 
generally wished to accelerate gains (mean=.52, SD=.34), but were indifferent with respect to the 
timing of losses (mean=0, SD=.50), replicating previous research on intertemporal preference for 
gains and losses.  This difference was significant (t(168)=12.2, p<.001, d=.93. (2) The predicted 
experienced utility of events was not substantially affected by the time at which they would 
occur, F(4,164)=1.5, p=.20, η2=.04.  On our 7-point bipolar scale, participants rated our ten gain 
events as significantly more good (mean=65, SD=26) than the ten loss events were bad (mean= -
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53, SD=23). This comparison, however, is difficult to interpret, because we constructed the 
events being rated and did not attempt to equate them on outcome strength a priori, and because 
if respondents norm their ratings against other events of the same valence the numbers on 
different sides of a bipolar scale cannot be readily compared (McGraw, Larsen, Kahneman, & 
Schkade, 2010).  (3) The anticipation of losses was judged to be much more negative (mean=-45, 
SD=30) than the anticipation of gains was positive (mean=18, SD=39), t(168)=8.4, p<.001, 
d=.65, replicating the results of Study 1.   
Table 2 
Average anticipation utilities (a) of each event, utilities of experiencing (e) each event, and 
intertemporal choice (c) for when to experience each event, followed by the standardized betas 
for anticipation utility (beta(a)) predicting intertemporal choice (c) in regression while 
controlling for experienced utility (e), all collapsing across time delays, in Study 2.   
event a e c beta 
(a) 
a free 5-day vacation to the destination of your choice 28 75 .19 -.40** 
eating a nice meal out at a restaurant 28 59 .29 -.31** 
a kiss from the movie star of your choice 22 46 .32 -.17* 
receiving a good grade or performance review 21 68 .68 -.22** 
getting a gift in the mail from a family member 21 64 .49 -.35** 
spending time with your best friend 21 67 .44 -.21** 
hour of favorite TV or book 13 52 .57 -.27** 








Average experience utility, anticipation utility, and intertemporal choices (1 = preference for 
experiencing the event immediately) for the 10 gains and 10 losses in Study 2, collapsing across 
time delays.  Error bars represent +/- one standard error. 
improved energy and health for 10 days 9 67 .69 -.31** 
winning the lottery 6 83 .79 -.31** 
doing difficult home cleaning and renovation for 5 days -19 -13 .02 -.36** 
an hour at the local Department of Motor Vehicles -26 -35 .11 -.30** 
paying a $50 fine -27 -39 .02 -.28** 
giving a stressful 60 minute improvised speech -45 -37 -.10 -.20* 
being sick for 10 days -47 -65 -.15 -.32** 
a painful dental procedure -53 -63 .18 -.44** 
receiving a bad grade or performance review -55 -65 .15 -.38** 
a confrontation with your co-worker or family member -57 -60 .18 -.35** 
twenty painful (but harmless) electric shocks -58 -66 .13 -.36** 






Anticipation utility and experience utility for each event were positively correlated, but 
only modestly so, for gains (average r=.31) as well as losses (average r=.41) (see Table 2).  This 
provides evidence for the convergent and divergent validity for our measure of anticipation: 
participants tended to report enjoying looking forward to an event more the better that was, and 
participants reported dreading bad things more if they were expected to be especially bad. Yet at 
the same time, the ratings of anticipation and experience utility were distinct in participants' 
ratings.  
The anticipation utility of positive and negative events weakened with delay, 
F(4,164)=6.0, p<.001, η2=.13, such that the anticipation of positive events grew less pleasant and 
the anticipation of negative events less aversive as the events were delayed farther into the 





 To more fully explore the prevalence of dread vs savoring, we coded each participant for 
whether they showed "dread bias" or not: we reverse coded the anticipation ratings for losses, 
and compared the average anticipation ratings for gains and losses for each participant.  If the 
ratings for losses were higher than for gains, that participant was coded as exhibiting "dread 
bias." We found that 73% of participants showed this pattern of ratings, which was significantly 
greater than chance (ie, 50%), z=6.7, p<.001.  We then compared the intensity of dread and 
savoring by reverse coding the ratings for losses and throwing out any scores of zero or less.  
Dreaded losses were rated 65 on average (SD=34), on a 1-100 scale, compared with an average 
of 57 (SD=33) for savored gains.  To compare these ratings, we used a mixed model with a fixed 
effect of sign and random effects of subject and item, confirming a significant effect of sign, 
F(1,1914)=82.1, p<.001.  However, the effect size was small, d=.24. Thus, dread was both more 
common than savoring and somewhat stronger when it occurred.   
 To see whether anticipation utility predicted intertemporal preference while controlling 
for event value, we ran a linear mixed model predicting time preference (coded as 1, 0, or -1, 
where 1 indicates “immediately”) with anticipation utility and experience utility as fixed factors 
and subject ID and event as random factors. This confirmed a main effect of anticipation 
predicting choice, b=-.004, t(3375.3)=-15.9, p<.001. The slope of -.004 indicates that greater 
pleasurable anticipation was associated with a preference for delaying the event, with a swing 
from the most negative anticipation (-100) to the most positive (100) associated with a change of 
-.8 scale points in time preference (roughly the difference between "immediately" and "don't 
care"). The mixed model also revealed a main effect of experience utility on time preference, 
b=.006, t(3345.6)=26.7, p<.001, indicating that participants tended to prefer positive events 





interaction, b=.000007, t(3249.2)=2.5, p<.05, indicated that the more negative an event was 
judged to be, the stronger was the relationship between anticipation utility and time preference.  
Subsequently, to investigate the robustness of the relationship between anticipation utility 
and time preference, we ran a separate regression for each event, with the results summarized in 
Table 2.  In all 20 cases, controlling for event value, we found that individuals who found the 
event more pleasurable to anticipate had a greater preference for deferring it, as would be 
expected.  The average standardized beta for anticipation utility predicting time preference 
(while controlling for event value) was -.30.  Overall, expected anticipation utility modestly 
predicted time preference, thus supporting Loewenstein's (1987) model of anticipation as an 
important predictor of intertemporal choice.  
Discussion 
 Consistent with the results of Study 1, dread was roughly twice as common as savoring.  
As in previous research, participants preferred to have gains immediately more often than they 
preferred to postpone losses, demonstrating the sign effect.  Furthermore, the utility of 
anticipating each event predicted intertemporal preference for that event, even while controlling 
for the utility of experiencing that event.  In every case, greater positive anticipation predicted a 
preference to postpone the event.  For example, participants who enjoyed looking forward to a 
vacation, or who didn't mind anticipating a dental appointment, were more likely to choose to 
postpone those events. 
 To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first study that directly links ratings of 
anticipation utility with intertemporal preference for gains and losses.  Although Harris (2010) 





preference.  It is difficult to know why we obtained a significant relationship while she did not, 
but we speculate that differences in question and response-scale wording may be important, 
because participants are not accustomed to rating the anticipation utility of an event.  In 
particular, having participants rate the experience utility of the event before rating the 
anticipation utility may help them treat these as distinct concepts.   
 There was significant heterogeneity among the various gain and loss events used in this 
study.  For example, although the strongest dread was reported for the leg amputation event, 
anticipation utility was only weakly predictive of time preference for that event.  
Understandably, participants generally preferred to delay it as much as possible, even if they 
dreaded it strongly.  This illustrates the point that anticipation utility is only one of many factors 
driving intertemporal choice. 
 An important question concerns whether the "dread looms larger" effect is independent of 
the well-known fact of loss aversion: that losses loom larger than gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979).  Although we attempted to measure and statistically control for the experience utility of 
each event, recent findings in risky choice (McGraw, et al., 2010) suggest that responses on each 
side of a bipolar scale, such as those in Study 2, may not be comparable.  The theory is that when 
a person rates the value of an event, he first chooses one side of the scale (positive or negative), 
and then mentally compares the target event to other same-sign events (comparing gains with 
gains or losses with losses) to determine the magnitude of the value.  For example, when rating 
how bad a painful dental procedure might be, participants are likely to compare it to the other 
negative events (such as the electric shocks) than to any of the positive events (such as the nice 
dinner out). It is difficult to know, therefore, how the gains and losses used in Study 2 compared 





observed results. In Study 3, therefore, we tested whether loss aversion might account for the 
"dread looms larger" effect, in two ways. As recommended by McGraw et al (2010), we used 
unipolar scales when measuring utility, which should detect loss aversion, enabling us to control 
for it statistically. Second, we presented participants with pairs of events, and then analyzed only 
pairs that participants themselves had judged to be equivalent.  
 
Study 3 
Participants & Procedure 
A national sample of 108 participants were recruited online from Amazon's Mechanical 
Turk service and paid $4.55 for participating. Forty-six participants an attention check, using the 
same method as Study 1 and Study 2, and were excluded from further analysis. The experimental 
procedure was similar to Study 2, with several exceptions. First, participants read a list of all 
twenty events (the same as used in Study 2), to familiarize them with the range of events and 
facilitate comparisons between gains and losses. Then, participants were presented with one 
event at a time, similar to Study 1. For each event, participants were first asked, "Assuming you 
knew this event were coming, when would you prefer it to happen? Immediately, or in one 
week?", to which they responded on a 7-point scale from "Strongly prefer immediately" to 
"Strongly prefer in one week." Subsequently, participants were asked two questions to determine 
experience utility: "Please imagine this event happening one week from now. Would 
experiencing this event be pleasurable or unpleasurable?" and then "How strongly would 
experiencing this event affect your feelings at that time?" which they answered by clicking on a 





were asked two question to determine anticipation utility: "If this event were one week away, 
would the anticipation be psychologically pleasurable or unpleasurable? In other words, how 
would you feel while waiting for it?" and "How strongly would anticipating this event affect 
your feelings while waiting for the event?" which was answered on a continuous scale from "not 
at all" to "extremely". After answering these five questions for all twenty events, participants 
were then presented with 36 pairs of events (one gain and one loss), in random order. For each 
pair, participants were asked "If you could choose whether or not to experience both these 
events immediately, would you accept this pair?", which they answered on a 7-point scale, from 
"definitely yes" to "definitely no", with "unsure" in the middle. Finally, participants answered 
demographic questions.  
Results 
 Participants demonstrated the sign effect, wanting to accelerate gains more strongly than 
they wanted to postpone losses, as confirmed by reverse coding the time preference for losses 
and running a repeated measures ANOVA comparing the ten loss events with the ten gain 
events, F(1,61)=34.3, p<.001, η2=.36.  
To analyze the experience and anticipation utility data, we combined participants' binary 
ratings (positive or negative) with the unipolar continuous scale, to produce a -100 to 100 scale 
comparable to that used in Study 2. To compare the strength of gains and losses, we reverse 
scored the losses. When judging the value of experiencing each event, participants rated the loss 
events as being worse than the gains were good, F(1,61)=4.4, p<.05, η2=.07, thus confirming 





scales. When judging the value of anticipating each event, gains averaged 22 (SD=52), while 
losses averaged -50 (SD=43), a significant difference, F(1,61)=43.9, p<.001, η2=.42.  
 To test whether "dread looms larger" would persist when controlling for loss aversion, we 
ran a mixed model with sign and experience utility predicting anticipation utility, with a random 
effect of subject. This confirmed that losses were dreaded more than gains were savored, even 
while controlling for experience utility, F(1,1201.8)=13.9, p<.001. We then selected only pairs 
of gains and losses that participants were "unsure" whether they would accept. There were 128 
such pairs. Among these, the average anticipation for gains was 24 (SD=50), compared with -57 
(SD=34) for losses, a significant difference with a mixed model, F(1,215)=53.1, p<.001.  
 Finally, we found that anticipation predicted time preference while controlling for 
experience utility using a mixed model with random effects of subject and event, b=-.008, 
F(1,1234.6)=40.2, p<.001. Experience utility was also a significant predictor, b=.015, 
F(1,1215.3)=154.6, p<.001, but the interaction was non-significant, p=.55.  
General Discussion 
 Just as research on risky choice has found that disappointment is stronger than elation 
(Gul, 1991) and regret is stronger than rejoicing (Zeelenberg, Beattie, van der Pligt, & de Vries, 
1996), we found that dread is stronger than pleasurable anticipation in intertemporal choice.  
Anticipation utility predicted time preference, and was rated by participants to be stronger when 
the event was nearer in time, as consistent with previous theory (Loewenstein, 1987).  Taken 
together, these results may explain the "sign effect" in intertemporal choice.   
Given that dread is much more common than savoring, and that dread drives people to 





to be such a widespread problem.  One answer is that anticipatory utility is only one of many 
factors driving intertemporal choice.  Therefore, someone may postpone housework or other 
negative events for practical reasons, even though she does not enjoy having the housework 
hanging over her head.   
Another issue is whether procrastination is in fact a larger problem than its counterpart, 
impulsivity.  For example, if someone chooses to watch a movie now and put housework off 
until later, is he exhibiting impulsivity, or procrastination, or both? Finding the answer is a topic 
for future research: while we asked participants to consider negative and positive events in 
isolation, most real-world intertemporal choices involve clear tradeoffs between and immediate 
gain and a future loss, or vice versa.  Another important future direction will be to explore the 
role of uncertainty in anticipation utility and intertemporal choice.  In the present research, an 
attempt was made to control for uncertainty by telling participants that each event would happen 
for sure.  However, it is likely that the uncertainty of future events affects – and may even 
reverse – the pleasures or pains of anticipation: compare, for example, the experience of waiting 
to receive 10 million dollars at the end of the year, vs. waiting to play a lottery that pays off 10 
million dollars with a 95% probability.  The first would likely be pleasurable, whereas we 
conjecture the latter would be aversive for most people.   
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Intertemporal trade-offs are inherent in most choices, and are especially salient in environmental 
decisions.  Although psychology, anthropology, and economics each offer unique insights and 
findings on the mental and social processes underlying the evaluation of future events, each 
discipline also has its blind spots.  Crafting effective policy therefore requires an integration of 
these three perspectives; this paper offers a concise overview and guide, intended for applied 
researchers and policy makers.  Through three real-world examples, the contributions and 
integration of the three disciplines are illustrated. Ideally, each perspective feeds into the others 
in an iterative process, producing an integrative approach that is more than the sum of its parts.  
 







About time: An integrative approach to effective environmental policy 
1.  Introduction  
 Countless human decisions involve the need to balance gains or losses that are immediate 
or near-term against other benefits or costs that are anticipated to arrive at later dates.  The 
prosaic personal drama of staying on a diet, the decision to put away savings for retirement, the 
analysis of investment returns on a real estate development project, global arguments concerning 
the wisdom of curtailing greenhouse gas emissions in order to head off accelerating climate 
change – these and numerous other decisions, great and small, call on us to weigh the claims of 
the present against those of the future.  Such challenges, which raise the issue of intertemporal 
choice, are ubiquitous.   
People often choose immediate gratification at the expense of future benefits.  The further 
off an event is, generally, the more we discount it.  For example, one reason that people don't 
invest in profitable retirement accounts is that the costs are immediate while the benefits are far 
in the future (Thaler & Benartzi, 2004).  Many other social ills, such as obesity (Chabris, 
Laibson, Morris, Schuldt, & Taubinsky, 2008; Reimers, Maylor, Stewart, & Chater, 2009), 
smoking (Bickel, Odum, & Madden, 1999), and over-exploitation of natural resources (Farber & 
Hemmersbaugh, 1993; Kortenkamp & Moore, 2006; Markandya & Pearce, 1991) can similarly 
be traced to temporal shortsightedness.  The role of time is especially salient for environmental 
decisions, which have consequences that unfold over decades, centuries, or millennia.  Policies 
that encourage long-term, sustainable choices may be crafted more readily based on an 





concise guide and recommendations for integrating the insights on intertemporal choice from 
three disciplines – economics, psychology, and anthropology.   
1.1.  Outline of the paper 
Economics, psychology, and anthropology each offer distinct frameworks for decisions 
involving immediate and deferred outcomes.  Table 1 offers a synopsis of the three approaches. 
Section 2 gives an overview of the contributions and shortcomings of each discipline. Section 3 
illustrates an integrative approach, applying the three fields to three real-world, environmental 
examples: an individual choosing a light-bulb, a small business considering LEED compliant 
building renovations, and a population considering a new power source. Finally, section 4 
concludes with a few remarks on what is, perhaps, the ultimate intertemporal environmental 






An overview of the economic, psychological, and anthropological approaches to intertemporal 
choice. 
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2.1.  Intertemporal choice in Economics 
Economists study how individuals allocate resources to satisfy their desires -- in other 
words, how individuals make decisions between various options. Economics provides methods 
to model and analyze decisions and offers strategies to prescribe good choices.  These methods 
and strategies are grounded in a number of core assumptions.
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Economists generally treat the decision-making process as if people have innate 
preferences that drive how they make decisions: each individual inherently likes some things 
better than others.  Those preferences are stable -- essentially unchanging though time, and 
consistent across choices. So for example, if you are confronted with a choice between three 
bananas and two apples, you will either prefer three bananas to two apples; or you will prefer 
two apples to three bananas; or, you’ll be indifferent -- always.   
Furthermore, it is assumed that people act logically and strategically on the basis of those 
preferences.  They do not make mistakes. Individuals know what satisfies them and they choose 
accordingly. They try to get what they want as best they can under the circumstances they find 
themselves in. (Economists often recognize that people may not have all the information they 
need to make decisions, and, moreover, may lack the time or knowledge to obtain it.) 
These core assumptions create a framework within which economists can meaningfully 
state, analyze, and solve problems. Since preferences in principle do not change, when an 
economist observes that a person’s choices appear to exhibit inconsistencies, the economist looks 
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for an external factor that might be responsible, such as changes in market prices, technology or 
law.  So, from the viewpoint of economics, decision-making is seen as navigating problems of 
constrained optimization.  People try to satisfy their innate desires in a consistent manner while 
strategically navigating various real-life constraints, such as economic budgets and time 
limitations.   
In this framework, an intertemporal choice is one in which a person incurs a cost up front 
in order to receive benefits that will be realized later.  In many respects, economists treat this 
type of decision problem like any other: the decision is simply a tradeoff between two goods, 
available at different times. That said, economists do factor in human impatience. When people 
want something, they prefer to have it sooner rather than later.  And if they do not want 
something, they prefer to pay that cost later rather than sooner.  People generally want to acquire 
benefits as quickly as possible and push off costs as far into the future as possible.  
While impatience is a matter of taste, there are also perfectly rational reasons for having 
good things sooner and bad things later. For example, getting $100 today is better than getting 
$100 in ten years because the immediate $100 could be put in the bank to earn interest in the 
meantime. Furthermore, because most people (and nations) grow richer over time, $100 today is 
relatively more useful today than it will be in the future. In other words, $100 is worth more to a 
poor person (today) than to a rich person (in the future).  
Thus, according to economic analysis, it is perfectly rational, even advisable, to discount 
future costs and benefits. Traditionally, an exponential discounting model is used (Samuelson, 
1937) that functions much like an interest rate in reverse.
10
 For example, with a 6% continuously 
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compounded discount rate, getting $100 in ten years is worth about the same as getting $55 
today.   
In the examples to follow, the individual shopper choosing a light bulb, the group 
renovating a building and the community deciding whether or not to build a wind power plant 
are all, from the standpoint of economics, facing investment choices and performing investment 
analysis.   
2.2 Intertemporal choice in Psychology 
Psychologists have focused on describing the cognitive, emotional, motivational, and 
contextual factors that influence time preference, and particularly on impulse control or delay of 
gratification.  For example, it is much easier to resist a dessert if it is out of sight or if you 
thought about an abstract way (Mischel & Gilligan, 1964; Mischel & Baker, 1975; Mischel, 
Shoda & Rodriguez, 1989; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Liberman & Trope, 2008).  Thus, rather 
than being fixed and immutable, one's time preference for immediate dessert vs future health 
may vary from situation to situation or from one frame of mind to another.   
Importantly, this often leads to inconsistencies in time preference.  For example, someone 
may plan a diet while at home in front of his computer, but quickly abandon it when a dessert is 
sitting in front of him after dinner.  In general, people sharply overvalue the present, to an extent 
not predicted or advised by the economic model; in a review of 42 studies of discounting, 22 
found discount rates of 60% or more (Frederick, 2002).  Thus while economics prescribes an 
exponential discounting model, empirical studies have found that a hyperbolic model (showing a 
sharp initial decline) is significantly better for describing the intertemporal choices that both 





Choices between immediate and delayed rewards also depend on perceptions of delay 
and scale (Ainslie 1975; Zauberman et al., 2009).  For example, the difference between one day 
from now and two days from now is much more important to people than the difference between 
365 days from now and 366 days from now.  This is analogous to the economists' concept of 
"decreasing marginal utility", except that it applies to time delays, rather than consumption 
amounts.   
Motivational factors such as goals and preferred approaches to goal pursuit (Higgins, 
1998), also contribute to the way that individuals make intertemporal choices.  Kivetz and Tyler 
(2007) have shown that different time perspectives activate different representations of the self 
(idealistic vs.  pragmatic), which in turn influence preferences for different kinds of benefits.   
Other motivational factors, like a desire to fit in with a group, to live up to the expectations of 
respected others, and to be evaluated positively when compared with others ("social 
comparison"), also likely affect intertemporal choice and suggest areas for intervention, as 
explained in more detail in Section 3.2.3. 
Recent research has shown that time preference is also strongly affected by "decision 
architecture" – by the way in which a choice is posed and the order in which the alternatives are 
considered (e.g., McKenzie, 2004; Weber et al., 2007).  For example, if a shopper purchases 
something online, and the default shipping option is to receive it in 5 days, the shopper will be 
more patient (and less willing to pay a premium to receive the item earlier) than if the default 
shipping option is to receive it in two days.   
2.3 Intertemporal choice in Anthropology 
Anthropologists analyze how people’s connection to an enduring community influences 





related – that they pursue.  Long-term goals are not readily represented as economic "streams of 
consumption" in distinct time periods.  They can include long-term preservation of objects, 
relationships, and species.  In the environmental domain: in a community living near a glacier, 
many inhabitants might view melting as a massive loss, not in the sense only of period-by-period 
“consumption” (water, recreation, tourism, etc.) but also in a more timeless sense, the loss of its 
iconic value (Orlove, 2009). 
Anthropological research has often focused on the cultural construction of time.  In this 
sense, time is not the objective dimension studied by economists (as by physical scientists), nor 
the personally subjective dimension studied by psychologists, but a collective dimension.  Many 
cultures emphasize the repetitive nature of time (often called "cyclical" time, though this spatial 
metaphor may confuse as much as it clarifies); people choose actions that are appropriate to a 
particular season, or a particular stage in the life-cycle, or to day or night, or to a phase in a 
calendar that marks ritual and secular periods.  An American might want to eat turkey on 
Thanksgiving, whether that day falls tomorrow or in a number of months.  Similarly, that 
American might save an old toy with the thought of giving it to some grandchild that would be 
born years or decades in the future; the value of the toy would not vary in any simple fashion 
with the interval between the present and the date of the possible birth of the grandchild.   
This cultural construction of time can be important in policy-relevant arenas as well as in 
the more personal and familial contexts just mentioned.  The residents of a town that has had a 
major decline in a key economic activity (such as a former lumber or mining town in the western 
U.S., or a rust belt town with closed factories) may frame decisions, whether in the near or 
distant future, in terms of shared narratives that contrast earlier periods of well-being and present 





or it might lead them to seek the establishment of a new, distinctive period within local history.  
These frames would influence their evaluation of projects that the town would consider for the 
near or distant future (Hodges 2010).  
2.4 Some limitations of the three approaches 
Economic analyses often incorporate some degree of "positive pure time preference" (ie, 
impatience), assuming that humans intrinsically devalue the future.  However, psychology shows 
that time preference can change, as people implement self-control or as contextual features 
change.  Furthermore, economics fails to recognize that people generally consider time in a non-
linear manner, treating immediate and future delays differently.  Anthropology introduces the 
idea of long-term goals associated with community affiliations.  For example, an individual may 
have a goal of providing a good life or a good environment for his future descendants or for 
future members of his community.  Since this goal will not be achieved or realized until after he 
is dead, it is not easily captured by the standard, additive, period-by-period consumption 
architecture of economic analysis. 
Psychology, in its emphasis on describing the factors affecting intertemporal choice, 
offers no clear guide for how intertemporal trade-offs ought to be made (other than the implicit 
notion that it is good to avoid inconsistencies).  In addition, psychology has not systematically 
investigated how people conceptualize and evaluate long streams of outcomes; it offers no 
alternative to the period-by-period additive model of economic analysis.  Furthermore, 
psychology has also often neglected the lessons of anthropology concerning the social goals that 
arise from affiliation with an enduring community. 
Finally, anthropology offers neither a framework for analyzing alternative social policies 





maker.  Each situation is considered afresh, to be understood on its own terms, without the help 
(or impediment) of a formal model.  However, anthropologists recognize that the same goal 
could be framed in different social contexts: someone who wanted to encourage suburban 
homeowners to plant shade trees could emphasize the contributions to the household, to the 
neighborhood, to the community or even to the region or nation.   
2.5 A further limitation: The problem of uncertainty 
When people are asked why they devalue the future, a common response is that future 
outcomes are uncertain.  Psychology and anthropology, therefore, generally treat uncertainty 
about future outcomes as one reason for discounting them.  This seems perfectly sensible, yet it 
departs from standard economic analysis, which separates uncertainty sharply from temporal 
discounting.   
The standard economic practice is to first consider all possible streams of future 
outcomes (contingent on the choices you might make); next, discount and evaluate each stream 
as though it were certain to occur; then, combine the utilities of the possible streams into a 
weighted average, where the weights are the respective probabilities of the various streams; and 
finally, choose the option with the highest expected utility.  However, the uncertainties affecting 
future outcomes are often too varied and complex to be representable by a set of probabilities 
that sum to 1.  These uncertainties involve not only rates of return on investment but also 
personal changes (including maturation, aging and death) as well as technological, ecological 
and social changes.  Most such changes can scarcely be imagined, much less assigned 
probabilities, whether objective or subjective.  Thus, while economics offers a clear guide for 





and anthropology, on the other hand, have offered no competing analytic tools for how we ought 
to deal with future uncertainty.   
3.  Three decisions about energy use 
To better understand what each of these three disciplines can tell us about intertemporal 
choice, we now explore three concrete examples about energy use -- a key policy issue with 
important environmental consequences -- at three timescales and group sizes.  We consider an 
individual shopping for a light bulb, a small organization deciding whether to pay for LEED 
certified renovations, and a population of diverse communities deciding on a new source of 
power.  We outline each decision, then discuss how each discipline informs our understanding, 
and what an integrative approach might recommend. 
3.1 Purchasing a light bulb 
Decision Maker: Individual 
Time Scale: Short 
Most people have continued to buy incandescent light bulbs, rather than compact 
fluorescent light bulbs (CFL), despite the facts that a CFL usually costs less (if one considers its 
much longer lifetime) and saves considerable energy.  This energy saving further reduces cost 
for the consumer (or whoever is paying the electricity bill).  Furthermore, the energy saving 
reduces the hidden costs (to many) of pollutants and greenhouse gases (if the extra electric 
energy is generated by burning coal, oil, or natural gas).  So the CFL is a triple winner.  How can 
its low market share be explained by economics, by psychology, by anthropology, or a blend of 
the three? If everyone would be better off with general adoption of CFLs, what changes would 





governments world-wide have legislated energy-efficient bulbs.  For example, in the U.S.A, the 
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 requires that by the year 2020, all general-
purpose light bulbs be as energy efficient as current CFLs.  Other jurisdictions (e.g., Canada, 
California) have moved even more quickly.  But why has legislation been required, when the 
financial and environmental costs alone should have led people to make the change? 
It is worth examining the details of the "triple winner" assertion: these details on the one 
hand show what large benefits have been foregone, in aggregate, by low adoptions of CFLs, but 
on the other hand, the same details also suggest why the triple winner has needed a boost from 
policy makers. 
A 26-watt CFL has light output equivalent to a 100-watt incandescent bulb, so the energy 
saving is about 75%.  A typical price for this CFL is about $3 - $4 and its typical lifetime about 
10,000 hours.  Thus the cost is about $0.35 per 1,000 hours of service.  At the time CFLs were 
introduced, the typical 100-watt incandescent bulb cost about $0.60, with a typical lifetime of 
only about 1,000 hours.  Its cost of $0.60 per 1,000 hours of service is higher than CFLs.  (More 
recently, however, "long-life" incandescent bulbs have become commonly available, with little 
or no increase in cost, thus gaining a cost advantage over CFLs in this regard.) 
It is in the area of energy expenditures that the two diverge more significantly.  Operating 
a 26-watt CFL for 10,000 hours uses 260 kilowatt hours of energy, costing something over $26 
at typical prices for electric power.  The 100-watt incandescent costs about $100 for the same 
10,000 hours (or even more, if electricity rates go up with usage, as is often true).  The savings 
on a household electric bill over the lifetime of a CFL is thus much greater than any difference in 





It is sometimes argued that people on tight budgets simply can’t afford $3 to $4 to replace 
a light bulb.  However, most of the time, people replace incandescent bulbs with stock on hand, 
purchased in advance.  Thus, they readily pay the same $3 to $4 for a six-pack of incandescent 
bulbs. 
As for greenhouse gas emissions, one kilowatt hour of home energy in the U.S. produces 
about 1.6 pounds of CO2 (U.S.  Environmental Protection Agency, 2010).  This means that over 
the typical 10,000 hour life of a single CFL, it will save 416 pounds of CO2 (compared with a 
100-watt incandescent).  For comparison, this is equivalent to driving 475 miles in a typical car 
in the U.S. (getting 22.6 miles/gallon; Research and Innovative Technology Administration, 
2008).   
3.1.2.  How economists look at purchasing light bulbs 
From the perspective of economics, the shopper selecting a light bulb is making an 
investment decision.  CFL bulbs cost more than conventional ones, but they also last longer and 
use less electricity.  So the shopper must weigh the extra cost for the CFL bulb against potential 
future returns--savings on electric bills and on the purchase of future light bulbs. 
Economists analyze this choice as a problem of calculating return on investment.  An 
initial upfront outlay of cash (the extra cost for the CFL bulb) will yield a return of a stream of 
benefits over time (reduced monthly expenditure on electricity and reduced cost of replacement 
bulbs).  Economists can evaluate this choice just as they evaluate the purchase of a bond.  Bonds 
too require initial capital outlay and generate a measurable rate of return.  And in either case, 





If the shopper is cash-constrained and is purchasing on credit, she would have to factor in 
the extra cost of the credit card’s interest rate, weighing the cost of capital against the yield.  
Generally speaking, the higher the cost of capital vis-à-vis the cost of electricity, the more 
sensible it would be for the shopper to choose an incandescent bulb.  The lower the cost of 
capital vis-à-vis the cost of electricity, the more reasonable it becomes to choose the CFL bulb.  
If the shopper is short on cash and does not have access to credit at all, if she needs the money 
right now, it might be sensible for her to forgo the investment even if it has a very favorable rate 
of return.   Because people have different costs of capital, buying the CFL bulb could make 
financial sense for some people but not necessarily for everyone.   
Suppose the decision maker cares about the environmental consequences of her choice.  
Economists would view the shopper as having a taste for environmental preservation and would 
see the feeling-of-doing-right-by-the-environment as something she consumes.  The feeling-of-
doing-right-by-the-environment would be a feature of the CFL bulb, which the incandescent bulb 
lacks.  This special feature could increase the value of the bulb enough to the shopper to tilt her 
decision towards buying it. 
If an environmental or government agency were interested in encouraging shoppers to 
adopt CFLs, economists might suggest trying to manipulate the relative price of the two kinds of 
bulbs by offering a subsidy for CFL bulbs (perhaps a promotional discount) or by taxing the 
incandescent ones.  Lowering the upfront cost of CFLs (while the flow of future benefits remains 
the same) makes the percentage rate of return on that investment more attractive, and shoppers 





However, since the cost of CFLs is already so favorable, one would have to ask whether 
these interventions would work.  It is difficult to understand from the economic perspective why 
consumers are not already purchasing CFLs in droves.  The best economic explanation may be 
that shoppers either do not understand or do not believe the benefits of CFLs.  But understanding 
and believing are outside the realm of economics.  Consumer psychology and shoppers' lack of 
trust in authority are better explored by psychologists and anthropologists, respectively. 
3.1.3.  How psychologists look at purchasing light bulbs 
We have argued already that the low adoption of CFLs is not primarily a manifestation of 
extreme impatience; rather, it represents a failure of understanding or of trust in calculations 
presented to consumers.  Insofar as understanding is an issue, one effective intervention might be 
to make the future costs more salient: for example, a requirement that a 10-year overall cost, 
including electricity cost and a reasonable rate of return on investment, be displayed prominently 
along with the immediate purchase price (e.g., $38 for the CFL vs $128 for the incandescent 
bulb, along with $3.44 vs $0.60, respectively).  This is similar to the way prices are displayed in 
some drugstores and supermarkets, with the total price displayed alongside the per-unit price, so 
customers can easily compare the value of a 10-oz. bottle of shampoo with that of a 12.3-oz. 
bottle. 
A different sort of intervention would address the fact that people are generally biased in 
favor of the default, or status quo (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003).  Whichever option shoppers 
consider first sways their opinion, and their subsequent decision making is influenced 
accordingly, reinforcing their initial reaction (Hardisty, Johnson & Weber, 2010; Johnson, 
Haubl, & Keinan, 2007).  Currently, people generally have incandescent bulbs at home, and so 





would be to make CFLs the default in new building construction (Dinner, Johnson, Goldstein, & 
Liu, 2010).  Similarly, asking that CFLs be positioned prominently in store displays is a 
traditional marketing device, which may influence shoppers' first impressions, leading them to 
weight more heavily the future benefits that CFLs provide.  Questions of economics come back 
to the fore when one asks about incentives for builders to adopt or for retailers to market CFLs 
more vigorously. 
3.1.4.  How anthropologists look at purchasing light bulbs 
The question of whether consumers trust the information provided about CFLs lies at the 
juncture of psychology and anthropology.  There are extensive and somewhat disjoint literatures 
in both fields, under the heading of persuasion in psychology and marketing and under the 
headings of trust and legitimacy in sociology and anthropology.  Trusting information also is 
closely connected to political ideology, in ways that may vary widely from one society to 
another.   
Another point of intersection of these two fields comes under the heading of affiliations, 
norms, or social goals.  It seems possible in the U.S., for example, it is primarily those who 
identify strongly as environmentalists who have purchased CFLs.  The CFLs may not be 
perceived as a triple winner but primarily as environmental amelioration.  Surveys of shoppers 
could determine to what extent this is so.   
Anthropologists might conduct ethnographic research on the shopping activities and on 
the use of light bulbs to learn how people act in stores and how they use bulbs in their homes.  A  
study of electricity use in China (Wu, 2008) showed that men, rather than women, typically 





(such as sewing clothes) than for men’s, so that men and women might have different priorities 
in selecting bulbs.  This study also showed that more expensive electric items are often 
purchased in stores, while less expensive ones are purchased in street markets.  Men and women 
differ in their interactions in these two settings.  This information, or similar information in other 
settings, could influence the design of campaigns to support CFLs.    
Cultural considerations may also lead to different interventions at different places and 
times.  A comparative study of domestic use of electric light in Oslo, Norway and Fukuoka, 
Japan, found that Japanese prefer to light their houses with fewer, brighter lamps, often located 
on the ceiling, while Norwegians place a strong value on having a larger number of smaller 
lamps distributed around the room (Wilhite et al., 1996).  The Norwegians also dislike the white 
tone of most fluorescent lamps, while Japanese actively prefer it to the yellower light of 
incandescent bulbs.  Interestingly, this study found that the average size of homes and the cost of 
a kilowatt-hour as a proportion of average annual income were very close in the two study cities, 
so economic differences do not account directly for the national differences.  This study suggests 
that Japanese would more readily adopt CFLs, while some technical changes -- producing CFLs 
with a softer tone and in a variety of brightness -- could assist the uptake in Norway. 
3.1.5.  Encouraging consumers to buy CFLs: an integrative approach 
The ideal integrative approach one uses the insights and methods of each discipline to 
inform the others, in an iterative process.  One might start by observing and talking to shoppers 
as they are choosing new light bulbs.  What factors are they considering? Are they mainly 
thinking about making trade-offs between immediate and future costs, or are they choosing based 
on other factors, such as tradition (buying what they have bought before), aesthetics (perhaps 





reasons)? One might also investigate the rational costs and benefits of different choices.  
Knowing the answers to these questions can subsequently inspire and inform experiments.  For 
example, if consumers are not aware of the long term benefits of CFLs, these should be 
highlighted.  Alternately, if tradition is the most important factor (buying what looks like what 
they had before), then perhaps the appearance of CFLs should be changed to match incandescent 
as much as possible.  Of course, before scaling up a successful intervention, it should be 
evaluated for long-term sustainability.  For example, if a new CFL bulb offers the same quality 
of light as incandescent bulbs but also has dramatically reduced lifespan, the increased sales of 
this type of CFL may or may not be worth the tradeoff, depending on how the calculations come 
out.  If the results of an experiment do not turn out as expected, further qualitative insight from 
shoppers may be instructive for understanding how the intervention was perceived.  In this way, 
the prescriptive, descriptive, and collective insights of economics, psychology and anthropology 
can inform each other, creating an integrative approach that is more than the sum of its parts.  
3.2.  Renovating a building for LEED certification 
Decision Maker: Small Group 
Time Scale: Medium 
 When companies decide to renovate their office buildings, they have the opportunity to 
plan renovations that would qualify them for LEED (Leadership in Energy and Environmental 
Design) certification.  LEED certification verifies a building's overall effectiveness in energy 
efficiency, water efficiency, CO2 emissions reduction, and other factors (U.S. Green Building 
Council, 2009), and is the most widely used and trusted environmental certification system in the 





LEED-compliant renovation and certification typically requires a substantial up-front 
premium (in the form of both money and time) but brings continual future benefits for the life of 
the building.  In a case study of a small commercial office building, LEED improvements cost an 
additional $7.41 per square foot, but delivered an estimated $1.38 per square foot annually in 
energy savings (Ross, López-Alcalá, Scorsolini, & Small, 2007).  Furthermore, LEED 
improvements bring improved employee productivity (Kats, Alevantis, Berman, Mills, & 
Pearlman, 2003) and a positive image for the company.  Other long-term impacts, such as 
reduced CO2 emissions and reduced strain on the electricity grid, benefit future tenants of the 
space and society, but not the company in particular.   
3.2.2.  How economists make choices about building renovations 
From an economist’s perspective, the problem of choosing between a LEED certified building 
plan and a conventional one is very similar to the problem of choosing between a CFL and 
conventional light bulb.  The building planning committee, like the light bulb shopper, is 
weighing an investment decision.   A LEED building costs somewhat more up front to build or 
renovate but offers an associated return on investment (reduced energy bills over time).  To 
evaluate whether or not LEED compliant renovations make sense, economists would compare 
the expected return to the cost of capital, just as they did when considering the choice of light 
bulbs.  In this case too, if the return is sufficient compared to the cost of capital, the LEED 
certification makes sense.  But here again the cost of capital is a key consideration.  If investors 
are borrowing their capital at a high interest rate, their returns would also have to be high to 





Although economists analyze the two problems in essentially the same way, the problem 
of LEED certification might involve a couple of additional complications.  Suppose, for instance, 
that employees work more productively in a LEED-certified environment, or perhaps LEED 
certification enhances the corporate image of companies housed in the building.  Economists 
would quantify "increased employee productivity" and "enhanced image" and factor those extra 
advantages into the financial analysis as increasing the stream of cash flow benefits that would 
accrue over time.     
Although the long-term financial, energy, and social benefits of LEED certified 
construction and renovation are clear, LEED-certification is not always in the short-term 
financial interests of a particular company, given their alternatives for investment.  LEED 
improvements are tied to a building, not to an organization.  So, if the decision makers that are 
considering LEED certification rent rather than own the building, they would need to consider 
the length of their lease and intended stay.  If they were to move or go out of business, they 
would not enjoy the long-term benefits of the improved energy efficiency.   
If policy makers want to encourage the adoption of LEED improvements, economists 
might there advise them to work with governments and banks to offer loans that are tied to the 
property (one example of this practice is the PACE program; see http://pacenow.org/). These 
loans cover the extra upfront cost of energy improvements and are repaid by present and future 
tenants.  Assuming the savings from efficiency and productivity are greater than the cost of loan 
repayment, present and future tenants would benefit.  This strategy would lower the risk for the 





If the decision makers are planning to finance the LEED building or renovation with a 
bank mortgage, there is another important practical consideration they will need to take into 
account.  LEED improvements cost extra, so the decision makers are going to need to apply for a 
larger loan.  To get the bigger loan, they will have to convince the bank to give it to them.  But 
they are likely to run up against a practical problem here.  If the bank does not have a way to 
figure out how LEED certification increases the value of a building or reduces the operating 
costs, it has no way of assimilating those benefits.  (Banks in the United States currently have no 
framework for taking into account the potential returns these LEED improvements will provide; 
there is no place on a loan application form, for instance, to account for the future savings in 
operating costs that will accrue from these energy-efficiency improvements.)  As a result, from 
the point of view of the bank, the extra cost of LEED certification only factors in as increased 
liability -- greater risk for the bank.  The bank is likely to respond as it would to any increased 
risk: by refusing to loan the extra money or by charging a higher interest rate. 
If policy makers wanted to encourage the adoption of LEED certification, they could 
counteract or ameliorate this problem with financial incentives.  They might subsidize the actual 
materials that go into LEED improvements, thus making the improvements cheaper and 
decreasing the investor’s financial risk (and in turn the risk to the bank considering the 
mortgage).  They could also create specialized financing programs to cover the extra cost of 
LEED improvements.  Investors could borrow the dollar amount of a conventional mortgage 
from their own bank, and then apply to a secondary financing organization (like a state or non-
profit agency) for the extra cost of LEED improvements. 





Although the future benefits of LEED improvements are delayed, and hence discounted 
heavily, social comparison and social goals can provide an immediate psychological payout.  In 
recent field studies, providing feedback on how much energy consumers were using relative to 
their neighbors led to significant improvements in conservation (Handgraaf, Van Lidth de Jeude, 
& Appelt, working paper; Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2007).  In fact, 
social incentives were more effective than monetary incentives.  Social goals, such as 
competition, are especially strong between groups (McCallum et al, 1985).  Therefore, policy 
makers could publicize those businesses who have signed up for (or already enacted) LEED 
improvements.  This would provide an immediate social incentive for other companies to sign 
up, balancing out the immediate financial cost.  Additionally, businesses with LEED-certified 
buildings could advertise this to their (environmentally conscious) clients and could potentially 
use the long-term savings from LEED renovations as a selling point (e.g., "passing the savings 
on to the client").  Highlighting this potential competitive advantage could improve the 
attractiveness of LEED improvements, despite their initial cost. 
3.2.4.  How anthropologists make choices about building renovations 
An ethnography of the decision processes within enterprises may reveal key insights.  
One recent study of building projects at a private U.S. college shows that some aspects of 
enterprise culture (such as satisfying the often conflicting goals of units within the enterprise or 
associated with it) may work against LEED improvements, others (such as an enterprise’s role as 
a regional leader, or a manager’s desire to leave a legacy) may be beneficial (Brown, 2010); it 
also shows that the larger goal of sustainability and the narrower goal of optimizing a score 
within the LEED framework often enter into conflict with each other.  Moreover, 





importance of building long-term trust of new regulations.  In a detailed qualitative study of a 
small sample of households, Gram-Hanssen et al.  (2007) found that Belgians placed greater trust 
on energy assessments for houses than Danes did.  This difference reflects both the status of the 
assessment (it was obligatory in Denmark but voluntary in Belgium, so Belgium excluded 
unmotivated people from the assessments) and the source of the assessment (Danish households 
received a label provided by an impersonal government agency, while Belgian households were 
visited personally by an engineer from a professional organization).  Kosheleva and Elliott 
(2006) show high levels of distrust of LEED and other green labeling for buildings in Russia, 
which they attribute to scanty information, weak regulation and fragmentation of political 
authority in the post-Soviet period.  These studies suggest that the routes to adoption of LEED 
labeling will differ from country to country and from enterprise to enterprise, and that those who 
promote LEED labeling should seek to build trust with decision-makers.    
3.2.5  An integrative approach LEED  
A policy analysis should first assess the costs and of the various LEED improvements, 
considering both what is best in the long term for individual buildings, and for society.  If it 
makes sense to promote LEED, the next step might be to find out who considers it, and when, 
and why.  For example, is it something that is considered by company executives, or proposed by 
architects or construction companies? Is it considered mainly for new buildings, or for 
renovations of existing buildings? What are people's near and long term goals when they 
consider LEED? Building off the answers to these questions, one can design psychological and 
economic interventions.  For example, if the main problem is that no one has heard of LEED, a 





introduce and explain LEED to clients.  The design of this information could be tailored to prime 
corporate responsibility or other pro-LEED goals.   
 3.3.  Building a Wind Farm 
Decision Maker: Large Groups 
Time Scale: Long 
 As demand for energy grows, and costs rise, state and federal policy makers are eager for 
new sources of power.  The choice of what type of capacity to build has impacts occurring on 
very long time scales, outlasting the lifetime of the decision makers.  The CO2 emitted from coal 
plants stays in the atmosphere from 5 years to many thousand years (Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, 2007), and the radioactive waste from a nuclear plant remains dangerous for 
many thousand years.   
 In 2002, a private developer proposed constructing an off-short wind farm in Nantucket 
Sound off Cape Cod in Massachusetts.  Although this Cape Wind project was endorsed at the 
state and federal levels, local communities and environmental groups had concerns about the 
long-term impact of the project on local wildlife, scenery, fishing, tourism, and energy prices.  
More recently, a group of Native Americans challenged the project because it would obscure the 
view from an ancient burial ground (Jesmer, 2009).  Thus, while the wind farm was once 
expected to be operational in 2005, construction has been continually delayed and is currently 
scheduled to begin in 2011. 
 Clearly, the Cape Wind project involves multiple stakeholders and decision makers: 





and building renovations), most of these decision makers are concerned primarily with the 
future, lasting consequences of the project, rather than the immediate costs.   
3.3.2.  How economists look at building a wind farm 
From an economist’s point of view, the decision about whether to build a wind farm is an 
investment problem analogous to the previous two examples.  In this case too, the environmental 
benefits cost extra.  The wind farm performs much worse than existing sources of power (such as 
the oil and gas plant which is currently powering Cape Cod).  Power generated from offshore 
wind is projected to be roughly twice as expensive as fossil fuel sources such as coal and natural 
gas (U.S.  Energy Information Administration, 2010).  However, according to analysis by an 
energy consulting firm, Cape Wind would nonetheless exert a downward pressure on energy 
costs in the northeast through bid-stack displacement, leading to market savings of $25 million 
annually (La Capra Associates, 2003).  Similarly, an analysis by the U.S.  Department of the 
Interior (2008) concluded "the rate of return for the proposed site...  exceeded 14%, which is 
greater than 10% to 12% rage that might be required by the offshore wind developer," using a 
7% discount rate.  The wind farm would provide public benefits through decreasing CO2 and 
particulate matter emissions, diversifying the region's electricity mix, and accelerating the 
development of wind power nationally.  Therefore, the project appears to provide a long-term 
benefit on the regional, national, and global levels.   
Building a wind farm differs from the previous examples in an important way, however -- 
it affects external constituencies.  Individuals or groups are going suffer costs (they will lose 
their view) without receiving any direct benefit or compensation.  These stakeholders might use 





If policy makers wanted to encourage the adoption of wind farms, economists might 
suggest trying to make the cost of wind power more viable by manipulating the relative price of 
the two power sources; either subsidize the building of wind farms or tax the building of coal 
plants.  Economists might also suggest addressing the grievances of the external stakeholders by 
allowing them to participate in the benefits – to compensate them, in other words.  A program 
could be established to make judgments about which grievances are substantial and how much 
they should be compensated, and then make pay-outs. 
It is likely, however, that compensating aggrieved constituencies for their loss of view 
might create new problems.  No matter how high the payout, some stakeholders will demand 
more.  There will be a challenge to figure out how to pay them the amount they really need to be 
paid rather than the amount they want to be paid.  And it is unfortunately the case that paying off 
people who are aggrieved tends to create incentives for the production of more grievances.   
In many ways, the Cape Wind project is a testament to the effectiveness of economic 
incentives for long-term development.  The private developer clearly was motivated by and 
benefited from state and federal financial incentives.  Without them, the project probably would 
not have even been proposed.  However, disagreements with the local community led to years of 
delay and possible derailment of the project.  Economic incentives might be improved, therefore, 
by giving additional immediate incentives to the local community as well as to the developer.   
3.3.3.  How psychologists look at building a wind farm 
 Psychologists don't often consider decisions of this scale and complexity.  One insight 
psychology does offer is that intertemporal decisions by direct democracy (rather than 





vary wildly, depending on how options are presented (Frederick, Loewenstein, O'Donoghue, 
2002).  Both extremely low discount rates and extremely high discount rates are often observed, 
both of which would lead to disastrous policy (Weitzman, 2007).  Therefore, appropriate 
discount rates for evaluating public projects (such as the construction of a new power plant) are 
best chosen by elected and appointed experts rather than by public opinion.   
Psychology can also offer a solution to the NIMBY ("not in my back yard") issue by 
trying to remove some of the emotionality of this decision for the local community or re-
construing the issue so that the associated emotions are more positive.  Reframing the decision in 
a way that highlights the long-term and socially far-reaching advantages of the wind farm (also 
promoting the region as a leader) might deflect attention from the downsides to local residents. 
3.3.4.  How anthropologists look at building a wind farm 
 Two anthropological studies bear directly on the Cape Wind project.  One study 
(Firestone et al.  2009) compared the project with a hypothetical project off the coast of 
Delaware; the researchers took great care to assess the difficulties of comparing a genuine 
possibility and a hypothetical project.  It found stronger support for wind power in Delaware, 
though residents in both areas expressed a number of similar concerns about tourism and the 
scenic value of the shore.  The study attributed this difference to several factors.  Concern for air 
quality is greater in Delaware, where coal-fired power plants have significant health impacts, and 
sudden increases in electricity prices have also created a concern for supply.  Several unique 
features of Nantucket Sound, the location of the Cape Wind project, may have also led 
Massachusetts residents to fear for the impacts of a wind energy projects more than Delaware 





Brown (2007) discusses a third coastal state, New Jersey, where wind energy projects 
were also debated.  The author reviews the state’s Blue Ribbon Panel on Development of Wind 
Turbine Facilities in Coastal Waters.  A large number of concerns were raised at this panel.  The 
panel developed a positive view of wind energy projects when one member proposed that they 
consider these projects as investments in knowledge that could pay off over many years in less 
expensive energy and in making New Jersey a leader in this new energy source.  The member 
found a social framing that was culturally appropriate and that gave cultural meaning to a 
possibly distant future.  Taken together, these studies show the multiplicity of cultural values 
associated with wind energy, and suggest that mobilization of certain values can lead to support.  
Following the panel’s report, wind energy projects were approved within both state and federal 
waters.   
This study shows the advantage of involving local communities early on in the processes.  
In the Cape Wind project, surrounding communities were not involved in the early plans and 
decisions, partly because the developer proposed construction on federal waters.  Local people 
became concerned that the developer had received privileged treatment, while they were in a 
disadvantaged position and unable to participate in formulating the project.  This lack of 
participation by residents was a serious problem: though some of the local concerns (such as 
detrimental impact on wildlife) proved unfounded, other legitimate issues (such as loss of 
livelihood for local fishers) were uncovered that had not been considered by higher authorities.   
Talking to people on the ground and doing ethnography thus has two types of benefits.  
One is improved information.  The second is the trust and legitimacy derived from participatory 
processes.  Thus, even if the final decision is not improved, involving stakeholders from an early 





3.3.5. An integrative approach to adoption of renewable power  
In this case, the first step might be to identify the relevant stakeholders, including current 
and future residents in the local area and the world.  Determining the "best" new power source 
will depend on many factors, including the goals of the stakeholders and costs and benefits of 
each option over time.  (One recent study emphasizes the different temporal horizons of 
participants in a government-led evaluation of wind energy in Germany [Gee and Burkhard 
2010].) Importantly, the preferences of the stakeholders may depend on how options are framed.  
For example, people might support at "surcharge" to pay for a new source of green energy, but 
oppose a "tax" with the same purpose (Hardisty, Johnson, & Weber, 2010).  Similarly, people 
might reject an immediate tax when considered on its own, but still prefer it over the idea of 
saddling future generations with the consequences.  When gathering the support of government 
officials for a new energy source with high initial cost but excellent long term benefits, a key 
consideration will be how to avoid the NIMTOF ("not in my term of office") phenomenon.  
What methods or interventions can be used to overcome this? Whether practical or 
psychological, it likely depends on the particulars of the place and the people, so an initial 
anthropological assessment may be instructive.   
4.  Conclusion: Climate change policy   
Tackling climate change is perhaps the ultimate example of a complex intertemporal 
choice problem.  It involves many kinds of decisions by actors at many group sizes (individuals, 
groups, and societies) on varying time horizons.  The complexity of policies requires the 
integration of multiple dimensions.  As the wind power case shows, anthropology can be useful 





alternatives along these dimensions, and economics can measure the payoff of different 
strategies.  Effective policy must leverage each level of analysis, and ideally use each to inform 
the other in an integrative framework.   
The million dollar question: Is it worth spending large amounts of resources now to avoid 
harmful climate change in the future? Rates of return on investment naturally fluctuate from time 
to time, but if the past is a guide to the future, it would seem virtually certain that economic 
"growth" will continue, so that future generations will be wealthier than our own.  Thus, many 
argue that future generations should bear the burden of responding to the impacts of changed 
climate, because they will have more resources at their disposal (for example, new technologies).  
This argument fails, however, if there is a possibility that climate change will yield catastrophic 
shrinkage, rather than growth.  Much depends, then, on pure time preference: on the one hand, if 
people intrinsically devalue the future, and if the probability of catastrophe is placed far in the 
future, the argument for leaving future generations to take care of themselves can perhaps still be 
made.  On the other hand, the argument for urgent action depends both on intergenerational goals 
and on viewing current mitigation of climate change as important to reduce uncertainty, 
specifically, to reduce the probability of future catastrophic shrinkage.  Overall, then, the proper 
response to the threat of climate change can only be determined from an integrative perspective.  
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